Leading Edge Strategies

AAAE Annual: Be Prepared and Proactive – General Aviation Airport Security Update

2012 May 2 by leadingedgestrategies

Dateline: 84th Annual AAAE Conference and Exposition
AAAE Annual: Be Prepared and Proactive – General Aviation Airport Security Update

Robert Olislagers, A.A.E. Executive Director, Centennial Airport
Scott McMahon, Morristown Municipal Airport
Kerwin Wilson, GA, Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement, TSA

Kerwin Wilson took over from Brian DeLauter back in 2011 but according to his bio has experience in the general aviation community, as did Brian. He has been involved in the development of the “revised” Large Aircraft Security Program and is reviewing several other programs including repair stations, 12-5 security programs, DCA access program and others.

GA is responsible for approximately 1.2 million jobs and $150 billion economic impact per year.

Wilson reiterated the risk-based approach mantra that TSA has been chanting throughout the week.

LASP
The previous LASP had nearly 10,000 public comments with over 80% of them negative. Wilson says that the new LASP is 180 degrees from what it was before and he believes the industry will like it. However, since it is an election year, it’s not on a timeline and is not likely to come out this year.

Repair Station
The program continues to be developed.

Maryland-3 Program
Each operator going into or out of the Maryland-3 must have a CHRC and receive a PIN number in order to operate in those airport, but they are not currently approved to do pattern work. The operator is only approved for one approach and that’s something that Wilson wants to work on and is on his desk.

DCA Access Standard Security Program
The program is now in the GA security wheelhouse with 167 FBO’s in the operators and 73 gateway airports. We are up 55% in operations into Reagan and Wilson hopes to see it at 75% soon.

There are 24 slots available and we’re not close to filling them at all. The first wave of operators were Fortune 500 companies. Wilson looks to continue expanding to other operators and possibly using third-party screeners to alleviate any potential burden to TSO’s.

Armed Security Officer – the fallacy of the program is that most airport operators into DCA know everyone on the plane except for the unknown ASO with the firearm. Although this process played out well in the papers, Wilson is looking at alternative measures.

“I will tell you this right now, we will not eliminate the ASO program,” Wilson stated. We probably won’t be able to eliminate it but may be able to get some alternatives to it.”

Flight Schools
After 9/11 a lot of flight schools disappeared out of the DC area. Wilson was involved in the establishment of the ADIZ around Washington DC. The GA community has shown me that you are part of the solution,” said Wilson. “GA had nothing to do with 9/11 and it’s hard to get a community to trust [GA] that they have no idea about.”

Wilson is looking at this program as well.

Secure Flight
Presently, the no fly list must be downloaded by the GA operator and compared to the flight manifest. Wilson wants to automate this process by this fall or spring 2013. “I want it to be web-based…so the mom and pop operations can access it.”

South Capitol Street Heliport
The heliport was shut down after 9/11 and Wilson wants to reopen it, while maintaining the same security requirements for other DC airport security programs.

Principal Security Specialist
I think every GA person and community should have a point-of-contact so we’ve divided up the community into six regions and we will assign a PSS to handle security questions on anything related to GA.

Robert Olislagers PhD, AAE, TLO, ACE-Security – Intelligence Sharing in the Air Domain
“When there’s actionable intelligence, stuff is already happening,” Robert said in his opening comments.

The traditional approach is to wait for TSA to disseminate information to the GA community and Olislagers has been very frustrated with getting intelligence bulletins three days after the media reports the same information.

Olislagers has been working with the Office of Intelligence on information getting pushed out to the community.

Olislagers asked the audience if anyone has ever shared intelligence information or security threat information with the TSA – several hands went up. The second questions was – did you get feedback from TSA afterwards. No hands went up.

Olislagers notes that it’s a shame because we’re always looking for patterns. “The attack in Mumbai was a wake up call and should be a wake up call for every terminal in the United States. It doesn’t take a lot of folks (to disrupt the transportation or any system).

“The intelligence community is not designed to share information,’ Olislagers said. “But it’s getting better.” Once the intel gets through the IC system, we may eventually get a notification that basically says look out.

Olislagers notes that about 80% of the groups are Salifist (radical Islam).

One significant weakness Olislagers pointed out is that Denver International Airport has not had a FIO (Field Intelligence Officer – TSA) for over 14 months and that’s odd for the 4th busiest airport in the world.

The intelligence community (IC) local connection is through Fusion Centers. They have a program called Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) or Fusion Liaison Officers (FLO) and the sole focus is to provide information to the Fusion Center (sort of like the see something say something program). Airport operators are eligible to become TLOs or FLOs.

Fusion centers have FBI, National Guard, and local law enforcement agencies – ‘if you have an interest in getting intelligence information, you can be part of the Fusion Center process… there’s no formal process to this, it’s all about relationships.’

The TLO program is a 3-day training program and does provide you access to timely intelligence information.

Information drifts to intelligence through a “puzzle” process – putting together pieces of information until it begins to form a picture. Robert told a story about a recent sale of a King Air and the buyer was asking unusual questions, such as how many seats are on the plane, rather than typical questions which are normally related to hours left on the engine and maintenance history.

Olislagers stories:
“Art Students,” two are students who were hopping rides across the country on GA aircraft – pilots were allowing total strangers on corporate aircraft. They refused to leave the premises until they were threatened with arrest – we have flight crews that are not following standard procedures.

“Cross Dresser,” gentleman was first officer on a Learjet, had checked himself into a medical facility, threatened to kill his girlfriend by crashing the plane into her apartment. He checked himself out of the facility. They moved the jet and closed the airport and 3 hours later they found and arrested the individual near the airport.

Olislagers recommended that GA airport operators first get a secret clearance. It allows you to get deeper into the system and even sit in the Fusion Center. Also become a TLO, and get hooked into Infragard (an information sharing program) for homeland security (headed by the FBI).

“At the end of the day, we’ve been waiting for TSA to help us, but we need to go out there and be proactive,” said Olislagers.

K. Wilson: the problem is there has been a lot of information about GA but we just haven’t put it all together. Wilson says he’s been developing a joint information portal for intel information on GA and intends to establish a feedback loop.

The 1-866-GA Secure line is answered by Air Marshals in TSOC. They will notify local law enforcement – Wilson wants to build a homeland security information network. Wilson wants the ability to take Homeland Security Information Network data and push that information out to the 600,000 pilots in the GA community.

The Q&A feedback
One individual noted that they had not heard any of the intel information previously from their local sheriff. However, another noted that he really doesn’t think that GA security is something he should worry about and doesn’t have time to worry about it.

The panelists responded that it’s better to be proactive than to wait for something bad to happen and then be regulated.

AAAE Annual: TSA Round Table Discussion

2012 May 1 by leadingedgestrategies

Dateline: 84th Annual AAAE Conference and Exposition
AAAE Annual: TSA Round Table Discussion

Moderator, Mark Crosby A.A.E. Chief of Public Safety and Security, Portland International Airport
Chris McLaughlin, Asst. Administration for Security Operations TSA
Doug Hofsass, Associate Administrator for Risk-Based Security, TSA

Hofsass began the discussions talking about RBS (risk-based security) and explained that it is not just about the passenger PreCheck program but that it has inculcated into the culture of how TSA approaches security, including general aviation, cargo and international operations. Hofsass noted that for every solution or proposal brought to Administrator Pistole, it must meet the following criteria:

Does it improve security
Does it create efficiencies i the system
Does it reduce the burden on the operators

McLaughlin followed onto Hofsass’ comments noting that some initiatives, such as different screening procedures for children under 12 and individuals over 75, while they represent a small amount of the total passenger count (about 6% of the passengers), but they represent about 10% of the total time spent in screening.

According to McLaughlin, TSA must have success in PreCheck, the under 12 and over 75 program, the passenger/canine screening initiatives, and other programs, must be successful in order to survive the coming TSA budget cuts.

The future of PreCheck may include military personnel (about 2 million eligible based on current standards) and possibly, Security Identification Display Badge holders, but to achieve the real economies of scale for PreCheck to be effective, a much larger number of individuals will have to be in the PreCheck program, Hofsass said.

Passenger Screening Canines (PSC)
Mark Crosby asked about the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network’s concern, about how dogs could be used for cargo security until law enforcement Officer response issues are better researched and resolved.

McLaughlin said he recognizes that this has been an issue that is very controversial in the industry, but that if he owned an airport, he would be begging for these dogs. TSA owns 940 dogs at this time. There are 16 certified teams, TSA is finding test explosive scents at an incredibly high rate and he has no idea where certain reports are coming from saying that the program is not very effective at detection. The actual success rate is classified as SSI, but he did note that out of six months of service, there were only 2 misses (known as a nonproductive response), with certified dogs.

550 people an hour (as a secondary screening mechanism), which is about the average number of people a dog can screen in an hour.

In a recent test on actual passengers, “We achieved a level of security that at worst was noninvasive, and at best, a positive experience for the customer,” said McLaughlin. He further noted that in both nonproductive response incidents in neither case was the terminal evacuated. “We have found a way to resolve ETD issues without engaging EOD, we do that all day every day.”

In response to ALEANs white paper on the use of canines for passenger screening, McLaughlin noted that ALEAN had not yet sent him the paper, but he has seen it from other sources and that he agrees with some of it, and disagrees with other parts. Crosby encouraged TSA to get together with ALEAN and the lawyers and airport operators, to clarify the issues and generate solutions. McLaughlin agreed that while the TSA lawyers don’t seem to see issues with the resolution protocols, there does need to be a better conversation with the operators to see if there are additional concerns.

Hofsass said that the canine screening option is sometimes a better option for PreCheck, or possibly to even use for the non PreCheck passengers.

McLaughlin fielded a question about why TSA has not increased TSO’s while passenger enplanements have increased, and instead have been using additional technologies and layered security measures instead. He pointed to the canine screening and the Assessor pilot-program currently underway at Boston/Logan as capable of handling higher passenger volumes without increasing personnel.

TSA is now looking at the 3-1-1 policy to see if there are further efficiencies that can be gained by possible changes to the policy.

Back of the House
Targeted, random screening through the Playbook process, has been effective at “warding off,” 100% employee screening at U.S. airports.

McLaughlin said that most of the employee screening measures, expect to see more of the same, meaning more random screening and use of Playbook measures and other similar programs, rather than looking at 100% screening models.

Credential Authentication Technology – Boarding Pass Scanning Systems (CAT-BPSS)
So far, the TSA has not been getting the throughout they would like to see at the airports that are currently piloting this technology.

Known Crew Member
This flight crew alternative screening program continues to expand through the initial pilot airports, and continuing to what will soon be 21 airports. It is only opened to uniformed flight crew members, but TSA has not started looking at flight attendants to expand the program. KCM does help reduce the number of required TSO personnel required to be at the checkpoint.

Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs)
Robert Olislagers, Director of Centennial Airport, inquired about the status of the FIO program and the ability to get active intelligence and threat information to the airport operators, particularly the general aviation operators.

Hofsass responded – the integration of the intelligence community at large continues to get significantly better in six month increments. If you were to compare with where we are now from where we were on 9/11, I would tell you the integration continues and we are getting better information than every before.

The level of detail the TSA is getting – the products are better now than they’ve ever been. While TSA is trying to build the FIO program, and airport operators are finding ways to access information, such as getting on JTTF’s, the challenge for TSA remains the “time to market” challenge – as we get better products from the intelligence community to get that information to the checkpoint and airport operators.

TSA’s 007 man, and intel ‘czar’ Thomas Hoops, from the Office of Intelligence, is focused on improving this issue.

Behavior Detection Officers (BDO’s)
Question from participant at a small airport, about whether the BDO’s can be better utilized, rather than appearing to just walking around the airport. McLaughlin said that TSA is looking to re-assign the locations of the BDO’s to be better effective. He also noted that the TSO’s will also begin to receive some low level training on suspicious activities.

A random thought here – perhaps they could dress up the BDO as a janitor, give them a mop and then have them watch for suspicious activity – like they do in Israel.

Thank you to Chris, Doug and Mark for your dedication and contributions to aviation security – Jeff

AAAE Annual: Transportation Security Policy Committee Meeting

2012 April 30 by leadingedgestrategies

Dateline: 84th Annual AAAE Conference and Exposition
Transportation Security Policy Committee Meeting

PreCheck update: more airlines continue to sign up for the program. The problem continues to grow, but is only available to a small percentage of the traveling public and the participants cannot use the program when they use a different are carrier other than the carrier they are registered with. How can this be expanded?

TSA’s Doug Hoffsass responded by saying that US Airways and United Airlines are coming on board this summer. The primary target audience has been the frequent flyer population and the Customs and Border Protection Global Entry participants. By next week, the one-millionth passenger will have come through. By this time next year the number of PreCheck participants will effectively double. Hoffsass also clarified that individuals who are part of Global Entry, can fly using PreCheck on any participating airline.

One of the challenges as the PreCheck program builds, perhaps to TSA’s stated goal of 70% of the traveling population, there must be a transition plan to take the existing screening checkpoint to switch over to predominant PreCheck lanes. Hoffsass responded that that will be addressed similarly to an Easy Pass process on a toll road – meaning, as the program builds, continue to shift resources to meet the level of demand.

Hoffsass reiterated that the goal of PreCheck is to be able to focus security resources on passengers that present a greater potential threat adn require higher levels of screening. The next hurdle to PreCheck will come as the frequent flyers have all registered and the Global Entry participants are all on board. Presently, frequent flyers are checked by TSA by inspecting travel patterns, and other indicators that are consistent with low threat level frequent flyer travel. Global Entry includes an interview with a law enforcement officer. What patterns will TSA look for for the casual traveler, who wants to become a member of PreCheck?

Other issues were discussed, but most were pushed to the TSA Roundtable on Tuesday.

AAAE Annual: NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman

2012 April 30 by leadingedgestrategies

Dateline: 84th Annual AAAE Conference and Exposition

(blogging live from the American Association of Airport Executives Annual Conference, Phoenix, Arizona – please forgive spelling and grammatical errors)

Chairman Deborah Hersman focused her comments on the recovery phase of aircraft incidents and accidents, noting that in the Reno air race crash, the crash of a regional jet in Lexington, KY and the crash of a private aircraft at the Columbia airport, had multiple post-accident issues that airport’s may not anticipate.

She noted that training, exercises and preparation should also include not just focussing on the response phase but also the recovery phase. She asks how airports will handle the inbound accident investigators, the inbound family members and the requirement of the airport to provide support to accident investigation teams. There may even be additional capital development as a result of an accident.

Hersman encouraged the audience to take advantage of the NTSB’s two-day training session on aircraft recovery. http://www.ntsb.gov/trainingcenter/CourseInfo/2011-Courses/AS301_2011.html

“Safety is what happens when preparation meets professionalism.”

AAAE Annual: Cargo Security Update

2012 April 29 by leadingedgestrategies

Dateline: 84th Annual AAAE Conference and Exposition

(blogging live from the American Association of Airport Executives Annual Conference, Phoenix, Arizona – please forgive spelling and grammatical errors)

AAAE Annual: Cargo Security in a Post-Mandate World
Speakers:
Tracy Fuller, Allied Barton
William Frain, SVP L-3 Communications, Security & Detection Systems
Yvette Rose, SVP Cargo Airline Association
Doug Britton, Division Director Air Cargo, Office of Security & Policy and Industry Engagement, TSA

Key representatives from the airline cargo security industry meeting at the AAAE Annual Seminar.

Frain kicked off the comments by noting that their objectives is to create technology that is upgradeable to meet new threats by upgrading the software, rather than always upgrading the hardware.

The majority of technology is image based – single image, double-sided image, multi-sided, although there is some explosive trace and even some use of canine. L-3′s focus continues to be on predominantly x-ray technology and presenting an image to the operator.

Frain believes that the key to keeping the cargo system moving, is automation, similar to the way the in-line EDS systems currently operate. He notes that one of the hangups remains TSA and that TSA needs to be pushed to approve new technology quicker. However, each country, Germany, France, the U.S., always have different standards, so the x-ray manufacturers have to create slightly different systems in order to meet all the different standards.

Yvette Rose, a “repeat offender” from the Cargo Airline Association, which represents all cargo airlines lead off with a presentation on risk-based, data-driven approach to Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS). ACAS is a pilot program that is currently underway.

ACAS started after the October 2010 Yemen air cargo plot. CBP and TSA collaborated with industry in the development of a pilot program for inbound air cargo. The express, all-cargo operators (FedEx and UPS) were the first to sign up, followed by passenger air carriers and freight forwarders with a plan to expand to the heavy freight operators.

ACAS allows CBP and TSA to receive advance security filing cargo data as a means to target cargo shipments inbound to the United States that may be high risk and require additional physical screening.

[Working Definition: Freight Forwarder - consolidates air freight from multiple shipments to ship on all-cargo and passenger aircraft]

The 2002 Trade Act required that airlines submit data on air cargo shipments to the U.S. CBP and TSA run that information through the CBP Air Automated Manifest System. For ACAS, a pre-loading security screening element added to the existing Air AMS system – directs manifest data to the Automated Targeting System (ATS).

Rose noted that the cargo carriers and passenger carriers already know quite a bit about the shippers and forwarders that ship on their aircraft.

After running through the ATS, certain shipments may be placed on hold, or undergo further screening measures. Some shippers may not want their cargo opened, such as Pfizer the pharmaceutical sales company, so protocols for these types of shipments have to be handled differently. This program is likely to become rulemaking in the near future, possibly in the next year.

Doug Britton, TSA, noted that the U.S. is still trying to make the deadline of screening all inbound cargo. Right now, we’re looking at about 57% of domestic cargo in the industry being screened, but for inbound cargo, there are additional challenges. First, there is a much higher level of volume coming in, TSA only regulates those companies, that are in the U.S. and then, only the forwarders, not the direct shippers.

Although TSA gave a mandate to the cargo industry of 2011 to have all airline cargo screened, the cargo industry said it’s not workable, unless they follow a risk-based approach. The law however says that the Congressional mandate says that 100% of all cargo must be screened – so the challenge remains, implementing a virtually impossible mandate (100% of air cargo screened) in a risk based approach.

One solution being looked at is identifying risk based on the shipper themselves. In parallel with this process, TSA has developed a tiered screening process – therefore, shippers that TSA knows more about, has lesser screening while others receive additional scrutiny and possibly a ‘do not load,’ determination. It’s the same basic concept as PreCheck, the passenger risk-based assessment process.

“We’re applying the same principles to cargo in the U.S. Those that we know less about, we put them through what we call ‘the Full Monty’ screening process, inspecting right down to the piece level. We are taking it from a programatic process to a risk based assessment.”

Cargo screening remains the responsibility of the airline – however, the risk based approach allows the airlines to apply additional screening procedures (that are SSI) on the foreign freight forwarders – who are not regulated by TSA.

Former Atlanta/Hartsfield Airport Director Ben DeCosta asked what would stop a Yemen bomb style plot from coming from Germany. Yvette Rose said that the airlines are using the ACAS system and hopefully advance intelligence gathering and sharing will identify the risk ahead of time. Doug Britton – replied that we learned a lot from Yemen, specifically that the tradecraft has advanced significantly and the sophistication of the device has improved.

Britton noted that the Yemen situation begin in the all-cargo community where they were not required to screen all cargo.

“The Security Directives put into place after Yemen, would have caught both devices (the Yemen bomb and DeCosta’s scenario),” explained Britton.

Jeanne Olivier, aviation security director for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, characterized our efforts to get international operators to comply with U.S. security screening standards, as essentially only strong-arming them – and followed up by asking if there are other methods being pursued.

Britton responded that the Cargo Airline Association has done a good job of getting compliance. National Country Security Program, (http://www.ndtahq.com/documents/BaltimoreChapterPresentation17Feb2011.pdf) was started in 2009, to get international carriers to share their security programs with the U.S., however, many countries were not very forthcoming.

“Over 80% of the cargo comes from 20 countries,” noted Britton. “We’ve received the country programs from the majority of them and they have significantly changed their programs since Yemen.”

Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session II

2011 December 13 by leadingedgestrategies

Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session II
Aviation Industry Perspectives
Jeff Price C.M. Principal, Leading Edge Strategies, Associate Professor, Metropolitan State College of Denver
Stephen Alterman, President, Cargo Airline Association
Duane McGray, Executive Director, Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network

“Beware of people bearing gifts as they might have liability attached,” warned ALEAN director Duane McGray in the last of the public aviation security sessions. McGray addressed earlier issues with TSA joint operating issues with airport law enforcement and the deployment and use of the vapor-wake detection dogs, mentioned yesterday by Congressman Rogers.

McGray clarified that the term “vapor-wake,” was used by Auburn University in the initial pilot studies, but that today the program is formally known as the Passenger Screening Dog Program (PSDP). In the U.S. there was an initial planned deployment of 275 teams and that the United Kingdom has used the program for man years.

McGray stated that of the pilot airports, presently, none of the airports will accept the dog teams after the pilot is over. “It’s not a performance issue, it’s resolution,” said McGray, In the thirty plus year history of K-9 use at airports, when a dog indicated a possible explosive device, the situation was treated as an actual device until determined to be okay. However, with PSDP, when a dog detects an explosive element and tracks down the individual believed to be responsible, a TSA bomb appraisal officer is called, who then interviews the individual, then notifies airport police if they believe further scrutiny is needed. McGray noted that this is the reverse of the existing process.

Steve Alderman discussed the fact that while TSA met the deadlines for 100% all cargo screening in the U.S. but not the international deadlines, was not their fault. “We’re dealing with the governments of sovereign nations.” Alderman believes that it will be 2012 or 2013 before foreign governments can meet the international air cargo screening requirements.

Alderman cautioned attendees that the vaunted air cargo screening program and other initiatives hailed by politicians and regulators over the past day and half are not as far along as stated, but that they `x3c4bvckjfrward.

Both McGray and Alderman noted that the lines of communication with the TSA and the industry are more open than ever before which has improved relationships and processes.

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Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session II

2011 December 13 by leadingedgestrategies

Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session II
Addressing the Insider Threat: Airport Access Control and Perimeter Security
Jeanne Olivier, A.A.E. Asst., Director, Aviation Security and Technology, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Laurie Aaron, VP, Quantum Secure
Christopher Runde, Director, Strategic Business Development, Alert Enterprise

Jeanne Olivier kicked off the session, talking about how “intelligence,” and other related information is an essential component to perimeter security, not just technology.

Ten years after 9/11, airports continue to implement both TSA mandated security measures, but also locally identified security measures.

“We’ve come to understand that different aspects of the “don’t knows,”‘ said Olivier. We now know that there are things that we don’t know. We know that there is some technology and certain processes have helped us close some security gaps.

Laurie Aaron brought some perspectives on the insider threat: can go undetected until too late; there is a higher chance of success and lower chance of being caught and can be disastrous.

National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) defined insider threat. Click here for more information: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_insider_threat_to_critical_infrastructures_study.pdf

Aaron discussed an OIG report on insider threat within aviation focuses on the badge issuance process, the failure to properly conduct background checks, airport workers using security badges to access checked baggage and secured areas of the airfield. She pointed out several past incidents where airport employees were able to smuggle guns, drugs and in one case, Mark A. Russo Long Island Macarthur Airport who not only lied to obtain an airport ID badge, but was in the position of checking the credentials of others who applied for airport ID.

Aaron defined the challenge of credentialing in being that there are hundreds of employers asking you (the airport security manager) to give hundreds of employees access to the airfield.

Aaron also discussed the phases of implementing biometric based access control:
Phase I: combine the STA and CHRC process using a secure two-way submission
Phase II: Biometric used for identity verification (useful for spot checked on the ramp)
Phase III: Biometric used on Smart Card
Phase IV: Biometric used in physical access control

Chris Runde, formerly of the TSA, added to the issue of the insider threat, is that many times the anomalies are clear after the fact, but the damage has already been done. But, Runde noted, that key to the process of effective security in credentialing, is to remove manual processes, review physical access and logical access policies and remove access upon termination of personnel who have access to the system.

Runde also noted that through security systems integration, the system can note characteristics of unauthorized access attempt irregular use patterns, and a combination of role and attempted access. As rules are applied and tested (such as use patterns) the system becomes smarter and you can refine the process to focus on specific patterns and rules that will identify the real threats.

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Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session I continued

2011 December 13 by leadingedgestrategies

Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session I
Aviation Security: A Look Back and A Look Ahead
Carter Morris, SVP Transportation Security Policy, AAAE
Douglas Hofsass, Deputy Asst., Administrator, TSNM, TSA

Doug Hofsass has been with TSA for quite sometime. He was on the emergency response team for United Airlines for Flight 93, then served as the Federal Security Director at LaGuardia and has served in several roles at TSA HQ. He has been extraordinary in his outreach to industry throughout his time.

Hofsass acknowledged that there have been challenges, particularly with the implementation of several Security Directives, but that with Administrator Pistole, TSA is trying to bring industry into the conversation earlier in the process to assess what will work and will not work. Hofsass pointed to successful programs such as the In-Depth Security Review (ISDR) but that there is more work to be done.

Hofsass commented that ‘”people feel better about working with TSA since they used to,” which was met with numerous positive head nods throughout the room.

“IDSR is one of the most successful initiatives that TSA and airports have taken on,” said Hofsass. With the trade associations, airport operators and TSA at the table, the IDSR began with the mission to clean up the SD’s, but has turned into a regulatory review and created a vehicle that can be activated, “we have a trusted group of individuals … that we can bring in and do an immediate threat stream analysis.”

Other benefits of IDSR have been good pilot programs to look at insider threat and other technology and process solutions, that are economical for airports.

Hofsass noted that when TSA personnel are discussing issues with Pistole, his first comment is, ‘have we talked with industry about that?’

TSA’s Transportation Security Network Management (TSNM) branch is now being reorganized to Security Policy and Industry Engagement (SPIE) will have the responsibility of driving policy for the industry but will go outside of commercial aviation.

Hofsass said that general aviation’s revised Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) regulations, and the Foreign Repair Station regulations, are on the front burner.

Former FAA Security Director, Cathal “Irish” Flynn, questioned Hofsass about White House and Congressional pressure to “do something,” when there is an attack, and whether TSA now has the wherewithal and credibility to stand up to lawmakers and say they are already addressing the issue and that knee-jerk legislation is not necessary.

“Having one of the world’s most respected and counter-terrorists chief, does not hurt,” said Hofsass. Hofsass noted that Pistole has opened doors to key communities that had not previously been accessible by previous Administrators.

Reno Airport Director Krys Bart questioned Hofsass about recent FSD proclivities to pushing TSA responsibilities back to airport operators, speaking specifically about exit lane staffing. Bart noted that this is similar to the early days of TSA.

“Is there a mandate for airports to man exit lanes at airports,” asked Bart.

“Not that I’m aware of,” replied Hofsass.

Several years ago, TSA did change exit lane staffing responsibilities to the airport operator where the exit lane was remotely located from the security checkpoint, but Bart claims that some TSA FSD’s are telling airport operators that they now need to staff the exit lanes that are co-located with the screening checkpoints.

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Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session I

2011 December 13 by leadingedgestrategies

Aviation Security Summit, Day Two, General Session I
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Leadership Discussion
Carter Morris, SVP Transportation Security Policy, AAAE
David Aguilar, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. CBP

(written in real-time during the session – please forgive grammatical and structure errors – comments are paraphrased, unless enclosed in quotes)

Aguilar started off by connecting the importance of CBP to the aviation industry as essential partners in counterterrorism.

The system will always be a “work in progress,” said Aguilar, discussing the border protection and aviation security industries,” because they will always adjust to what we do.”

The perspective of border protection has changed – previously, border protection was about methods, maritime, aviation, land – today, it’s about flows. The flow of commerce and personnel which requires a different strategy. “Used correctly, risk management and data management make us safer and more dynamic.”

“We have become managers of information,” said Aguilar about his agency that handles over a billion data lines of information are shared every day. “What we do and how we manage that information is critical to managing the security or our nation.”

CBP is now asking whether they can use the technology and processes beyond security, to assist the 98% of legitimate people and goods that are traveling across our borders – Aguilar believes they can.

Like TSA, CBP is another agency that’s moving towards risk based security – using intelligence and data to focus resources on the small population of individuals who require additional scrutiny. Also, CBP is working towards stopping terrorists and criminals from entering the U.S. early on in the detection process, not at the last point of failure.

Air cargo advanced screening pilot – the impetus for the air cargo screening was the Yemen air cargo bomb plot in October 2010. Aguilar said that it became critical to understand what was coming into the country before it leaves the International departure point. In just four months the pilot program begin screening cargo from 28 different countries in the Middle East. Aguilar however did not address the method of screening.

Aguilar says that the promise of “sooner, safer, cheaper,” has been met but there is more work to do.

Aguilar then expanded briefly on the Beyond the Border Action Plan, which is available on the CBP website. Beyond the Border articulates a shared approach to security in which both countries work together to address threats within, at, and away from our borders, while expediting lawful trade and travel (CBP website).

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Aviation Security Summit General Session IV continued

2011 December 12 by leadingedgestrategies

Aviation Security Summit General Session IV
International Aviation Security – A Global Perspective
Moderator: Benjamin DeCosta, A.A.E.
John Halinski, Asst., Administrator, Global Strategies, TSA
Zohar Gefen, Manager, Security Division, Ben-Gurion Airport
James LoBello, Cargo Security – America’s Region, Lufthansa Cargo AG

(written in real-time during the session – please forgive grammatical and structure errors – comments are paraphrased, unless enclosed in quotes)

Halinski: TSA has approximately 250 individuals operating overseas and a mandate to promote the implementation of global transportation security processes, while ensuring compliance with worldwide and TSA standards. Mission areas include: Compliance, Engagement/ Outreach, Capacity Development.

The key to fulfilling this mission is developing good relationships with the host government. TSA can’t tell the host government what to do.

There are several U.S. regulations that address foreign aviation security, including:
49 US Code 44934 (TSA Representative Program) resulting from Pan Am 103 in 1988
49 US Code 44907 (Foreign Airport Assessment), resulting from TWA 847 in 1985
44916: Foreign Air Carrier Inspections
114 ICAO
49 US Code 44924 Repair Stations
49 US Code 44906 Foreign Air Carrier
Part 1546 Foreign Air Carriers

Liquids and Gels (LAGs): TSA is working with the European Union and pilot programs with respect to screening LAGs – attempting to balance security with facilitation – “is there an ability to use a risk-based methodology.”

Staff screening: two schools of thought – single point of failure, vs. holistic approach to insider threat. ICAO is soon to come out with a staff screening requirement, but TSA believes that’s a single-point-of-failure, and that instead, we should have a layered affect, with background checks, random searches, etc.

Cargo: TSA is working closely with ICAO on transshipment cargo. Currently attempting to define high risk cargo, and how to phase realistic Standards and Recommended Practices that don’t kill the industry. “It’s not just about the regulators, it’s about business.”

National Cargo Security Program Recognition: looking at how foreign governments are doing cargo, then accepting their procedures if they are acceptable.

A 100% inbound cargo strategy is based on a risk based model. We will have to “sell” this, whatever process TSA develops, to the world, since we cannot mandate what foreign governments do – we can only mandate what U.S. air carriers do.

AIT/body scanners: TSA has moved forward with deployment – the EU is deploying the millimeter wave. We are seeing that body scanners are becoming much more accepted world wide.

Gefen: Ben Gurion is a medium sized airport, conducting about 12 million enplanements per year.

Passenger security in Ben Gurion is only one part of airport security. The main objective is to prevent explosion or hijacking on an airplane departing from Israel. Ben Gurion must also keep an eye towards budget, image and customer service.

There are four levels of security: a supportive infrastructure, state of the art technologies, regulations and the human factot (well trained and educated security personnel).

Passenger security starts with a short interview done by a security agent to determine the level of threat – we have several levels of threat. We use various materials and protocols, along with detection of suspicious behaviors. We check bags through CT scanners according to the level of security of the passenger. The process ends with passenger inspection before entering the sterile zone.

In the next few years, expect some changes to the passenger process in Ben Gurion – known as “the advanced technology concept,” which means implementing a holistic security solution, blending our human factor processes and technologies.

Gefen believes that there is nothing better than the “eye and touch” of a human security agent.

LoBello: noted that unlike passenger and baggage screening, air cargo screening is the responsibility of the air carrier.

The need for mutual recognition – ensure that air cargo is protected within various and changing government mandates; supply chain focus means securing ‘once,’ at the origin, having reliable partners and use of existing programs. The final focus is on technology and training.

The screening of air cargo is significantly more complicated than baggage – passenger bags are transported to security, prepare for security, with simple, density, definitive single commodity security clearing. Cargo is the complete opposite.

Ben DeCosta opened up the issue of Duty Free, liquors, and perfumes so that individuals are better able to buy and transport these items, without losing them at screening checkpoints. Halinski said that the EU has established 4 different types of technologies, from the most intrusive (open the bottle and pass a test-strip into it), to technology that allows you to keep your bottle(s) in the bag. However, he pointed out that airports tend to buy the cheapest technology, rather than the most effective.

TSA’s response to the duty free and LAGS issue is to conduct pilot-programs and see what works.

Gefen was asked about his impression of U.S. TSO’s – he adroitly deflected the question, “I’m not in a position to criticize the TSA.” However, DeCosta followed up by asking how Israel manages to do the security process and not only provide customer service, but make the passenger feel safe (something the U.S. TSA has been criticized for in the past).

Gefen responded that not everyone has to go through the exact same process but that it looks like everyone goes through the same process – not everyone takes off their shoes, but only a few selected people. However, they are moving to a single technology system that will check everyone the same, but (apparently) retain the risk based processes that are currently in use. (Author’s Note: language barriers here prevented a clear understanding of where Israel is going in the future of screening).

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