Leading Edge Strategies

Don’t hit the snooze on this alarm

2012 February 18 by leadingedgestrategies

Is that you, John Wayne, is this me?

2012 January 25 by les-admin

Blogging Live from the Annual Security Summit

2011 December 9 by leadingedgestrategies

I will be blogging live, from the AAAE Annual Aviation Security Summit, next week.

Ideology Dies Hard, maybe we need Bruce Willis

2011 November 23 by leadingedgestrategies

Ever notice in all the Die Hard movies that once the bad guys are dead, they stay dead? They don’t continue to inspire hundreds if not thousands of others? Too bad movies don’t imitate real life.

For the past few years, YouTube has been the place for those really upset with society to get their terrorist freak on. Fortunately, the propaganda machine was hit with the heavy sledge hammer on the day that YouTube Star and Chief Motivational Officer (CMO?) for al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan had Hellfire missile for breakfast. But I guess there are a few previously inspired nutjobs still out there.

The recent arrest of Jose Pimentel, suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S. demonstrates the power of the spoken word and the threat posed by those who not only inspire violence, but provide information on how to carry out such attacks. This model is not without precedent – it is well known now that Timothy McVeigh was inspired by the Turner Diaries, to carry out his attack on Murrah Building. Now, being a writer, I’m the last one to dress down our 1st amendment right to free speech, but every writer should realize that what you write, sometimes has power and influence. I guess if you’re going to yell fire in a crowded theater, when there’s no fire, don’t be surprised when someone pops you one. Remember Salman Rushdie?

The power of the Lone Wolf nor the propaganda ministers, should not be ignored. While large scale attacks, such as the Mumbai active shooter assaults, the train bombings in Madrid and the subway and bus bombings in London, along with 9/11, are devastating, hundreds have been killed by a lone wolf. The downing of PSA Flight 1771 in 1987 was by a distraught airline employee as just one for instance. The bombings of numerous aircraft throughout aviation’s history were carried out by a single person.

The Lone Wolf attacks seem to be ramping up. It’s apparently getting harder for the bad guys to put together a large-scale attack, but consider if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called “underwear bomber,” or Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, had been successful. Hundreds would have perished, and the response from Congress and Homeland Security would have cost billions more to the U.S. economy and eroded more of our personal freedoms and way of life.

While we have been worried about the large scale attacks, we should not lose focus on the Lone Wolf. The Lone Wolf is harder to detect – he or she lives among us and moves throughout our society with less suspicion. Operational security is easier to maintain when the Lone Wolf keeps his mouth shut, as compared to 19 people, their handlers and trainers, and support personnel, trying to keep their mouths shut. The Lone Wolf, when properly motivated, carries out his or her mission, rather than, as in the case of one of the 9/11 hijackers, who began to lose heart because he had a wife and child to live for. The Lone Wolf is a one-and-done operation, which are among the hardest to defeat.

What will stop the Lone Wolf? The first step is to eliminate the motivators and opportunities for training. The killing of a Anwar al-Awlaki and the editor of Inspire magazine, Samir Khan, is a victory for the good guys. Both used the power of social media to influence the masses, just as Hitler and others controlled the media in order to ensure only approved messages were sent forth. Inspire magazine provided blueprints for creating bombs and carrying out attacks. While similar “instructional” documents are available on the Internet, consider that much of what is on the Internet, isn’t accurate enough to stake your life on. Just ask any academic or researcher.

Most of the Lone Wolf attacks that have been recently thwarted have been the result of good investigative and intelligence work. This layer of aviation security cannot be underestimated. While the focus is always on the screening checkpoint, the reality is that the checkpoint is near the FINAL point of failure of the system – it’s better to stop the attack in the initial phases.

Other Lone Wolf preventative measures include, as I’ve always encouraged, good workplace violence training and being aware of your surroundings and the people you come into contact with. Lone Wolves exhibit signs far ahead of time, that they are disenfranchised – not like everyone else in the U.S. workforce, but enough to take violent action. While we all may despise working for “the Man,” there are those who have decided that their lot in life is really someone else’s fault, and they find inspiration and instruction on YouTube and in the pages of terrorist publications.

While the recent deaths of bin Laden, al-Awlaki and their ilk, have struck a blow for justice, there always seems to be someone coming along to take their place. Their influence has extended beyond their years here among the living, and continue to inspire others. There will be others. There will always be others. It’s not time to let the guard down. Bruce Willis’ enemies may die hard, but ideology dies hardest.

You can’t go your own way

2011 October 18 by leadingedgestrategies

Let’s Make a Deal – behind door number one is a no-hassle trip to your airplane, with no guarantee it will be hijacked or bombed. You’ll be flying old school.

Behind door number 2 is a body imager, whereupon your saturated fat bursting self will be viewed in all its unglamorous glory by people you don’t know – there’s even chance your unsexy image will be on YouTube before you are able to get to your plane, have your laptop crushed by the seat back of the insensitive jerk in front of you and the flight attendant gives you your peanut ration. But, your flight probably won’t be hijacked or bombed, that is unless some guy working at the airport, who is able to bypass security, decides to join al Qaeda.

Behind door number 3 is someone you’ve never met asking you intimate details about your travel plans, your personal life, and whether or not you still beat your wife.

Regardless, if you want to fly, you’re not getting out of here without choosing a door

So you choose door number 1, and behind it is a goat. Door number 1 means you’re not flying.

What’s next? If you choose door #2 the electric privacy rights groups will protest that your image is being displayed for all to see. If you choose door #3, the ACLU will protest that your intimate travel plans are “nunya,” as in none ya business.

As the old man in the third installment of Indiana Jones said, “you must choose.”

In a recent USAToday article, the TSA revealed their first major attempt at risk based security. Click here for the article. Whereas passengers have complained about the body imaging devices, now some are complaining about the allegedly intrusive questions that the new TSA assessor program is testing at Boston/Logan. It’s as close a mirror as you can reasonably get to how the Israelis conduct their operation and it’s too early to tell if it’s going to work.

Frankly, if this is done right, it should work. Even special operations personnel and undercover officers will tell you, the last thing you want to do when you’re trying to hide, is talk to someone.

As an upgrade from the TSA’s passive observation program, assessor puts security personnel before the screening process to engage in casual conversation to try to determine if an individual has something to hide. The process itself is time tested (when done correctly). It stopped the bombing of an El Al flight in 1986 out of London/Heathrow; security questioning is still used in airports throughout the European Union, like at the Leonardo DaVinci International Airport in Rome, and was widely used internationally prior to 9/11.

I have an old video clip that shows people being interviewed back in the early 70s, when passenger and carry-on bag screening first started. Back in the day, a plane was just as likely to take a weather delay as it was to get hijacked. We decided we needed to screen passengers for the safety and security of the flight – we used existing technologies and processes at the time. Today, we have another imminent threat and the technologies of the 1970′s are no longer adequate. We need to use the new technologies and processes  - so do you want door number 2 or 3?

If you really object to being questioned about your travel plans, then decide to head for the body imager. Otherwise, if you don’t mind sharing a few travel details, you have the potential to maybe undergo some lesser screening (someday). Regardless, you’re not getting on the plane without one form of screening or another. And frankly, I want you screened if I’m on your flight.

I applaud TSA for putting their money where their mouth is and making an attempt at testing this process to see if a proven technique is really scalable to our aviation system and to see whether it works.

Wrong action, wrong time

2011 September 15 by leadingedgestrategies

I was stopped by police for suspicion of armed robbery.

Okay, it happened in 1987, but I first, I didn’t do it, and second, I was the “victim” of profiling. Seems I was driving aggressively and at a high rate of speed, through a large parking lot, and subsequently past a gas station that was closed, then onto the Interstate at well above the posted limit. At least that’s the Deputy’s story.

I was pulled over, ordered to stick my hands out the window and keep them visible, and even made to drop the ice cream cone I was holding. Looking in the rear view mirror and seeing the Officer Friendly with his hand on his gun, appealed to my lowest need for survival, which is to not die by head shot.

The Deputy took my information, checked me out and then apologized and said that the gas station I drove by had just been robbed, and that while my car didn’t exactly fit the description, my actions were very suspicious. Maybe I should have sued him for profiling. The man could have at least bought me another ice cream cone (see, I’d just gotten sort of fired from my job at the video store and I was upset, so I bought some ice cream, ’cause that makes you feel better, and . . . well, never mind).

About 8 years ago, I was pulled over again under suspicion of “cruising,” which is now apparently illegal on the street I used to cruise on in high school. I should note that I was in my late 30s at this time and driving my very pregnant wife who was at the time in her late 20s. Boy, did we fit THAT cruiser profile – actually, we just happened to be on the road to our home from the movie theater. Other times in my life I’ve been in the wrong place or near the wrong people and have been questioned by police, asked for my ID, told to move along. I should probably have sued them all for profiling – that or I’m just a bad egg.

On the 10th anniversary of 9/11, three individuals were questioned after exhibiting what passengers felt was suspicious behavior on a Frontier Airlines flight. Click here for story. One of the individuals is now very upset and is blogging and talking to the ACLU about her options. I’m NOT saying she doesn’t have cause. I have plenty of friends who have been pulled over on suspicion of DWB (Driving While Black, is the term they use) and I can understand that when people resemble the people who hijacked planes on 9/11, the hackles of others with different skin color can get rankled. Heck, I still don’t like seeing red 2WD Toyota pickup trucks because I once had a neighbor that drove one and when he wasn’t busy serving time, he was trying to crowbar his way into a townhome I lived in.

What I am saying is that regardless of the outcome of her case or complaint, people should NOT stop reporting what they feel is suspicious activity. It’s not just the times we live in, it’s our society. I’ve called on suspicious vehicles in my neighborhood about four times. Three times it was nothing – the fourth was a vehicle used in a string of burglaries in my neighborhood. Had I stopped after the third call, just due to embarrassment of what the local police would think about the guy “crying wolf” all the time, then perhaps the fourth call would not have happened and criminals would have gotten another free pass.

Several years ago, a group of Muslim musicians exhibited what passengers believed was suspicious behavior on a Northwest Airlines flight. They were detained, questioned and released – then they sued the airlines and the passengers. Was their real intent to prevent or make people think twice about reporting suspicious activity in the future so some future plot could be successful? Did they really feel they were singled out due to their race and deserved compensation for pain and suffering? Or was this a security test?

I know the answer to the last question.

Whether the musicians intended on conducting a test of airline security, they did anyway. Even innocent passengers are conducting “tests” when they are stopped for suspicious activity, because those that intend to attack us again, are always watching. They are watching to see how we will react – what the outcome and reaction will be.  If they learn that passengers are not reporting suspicious activity anymore out of fear of reprisals, then that’s valuable information for them. If they learn the types of activities that were reported as suspicious, then that’s information for them. If they learn that we are still reporting, regardless of lawsuit threats or fears of being embarrassed, then that’s good information we want them to know.

Frankly, I’ve exhibited suspicious behaviors on flights that should have gone reported. I’ve been into and out of my overhead bag several times – mainly because I have a six-second attention span and usually forget what I was trying to find by the time I get my seat belt off. I’ve spent plenty of time in the lavatory, on a flight back from Cancun once (you figure it out). And being middle aged now, I’ve made multiple trips to the restroom and even hung out doing some stretches near the flight attendant stations. Had I been pulled aside, I would have put down any ice cream I was carrying, politely answered questions from law enforcement, then went about my way. But that’s just me. I don’t want people to be afraid to report suspicious activity, even if I’m the one doing it.

9/11

2011 September 11 by leadingedgestrategies

It was never my life’s mission to become an aviation security “expert.” In fact, I had only recently gotten out of a commercial airport security position and fully into general aviation airport management, when 9/11 happened. My intent at that time was to continue working at the airport and maybe pursue a career change into education or motivational speaking at some future point.

I guess sometimes your mission chooses you.

After 9/11, I never realized how many aviation security experts there were in our industry. I say this sarcastically, because the fact of the matter is that most of the people the media were offering up as experts had little to no idea what aviation security was all about. They were aviation safety and airline experts and some military and terrorism experts, who, by virtue of their somewhat related expertise in other areas, were overnight enlisted to the ranks of aviation security. It was then that I realized just how little anyone thought about aviation security. It was not taught in collegiate aviation management programs, except for one chapter in an airport management and another chapter in an airline management book. It was not addressed in criminal justice programs and the term homeland security had yet to be defined. Nobody went to school to become an aviation security manager.

Frankly, I wasn’t interested in jumping back into the security industry after 9/11. In fact, I didn’t even want to fly after that. Odd – I hold a commercial pilot certificate and had spent my life up until that point in aviation and I was afraid to even get back on a plane. When I did, I eyed everyone suspiciously and couldn’t wait for the flight to be over. I also experienced an overwhelming sense of guilt. I had been in airport security for many years and I’d seen all the holes, the gaps, the issues and problems, and never felt I’d done enough, or made enough noise, or that anyone would even listen if I did try to make a significant difference.

In 2003, I was asked to develop a course in aviation security for the 4-year baccalaureate program in aviation at the Metropolitan State College of Denver. I graduated from Metro State and had been an adjunct instructor there for about 7 years. It was then that I realized there was not an appropriate textbook on the market for aviation security. Many of us with similar charge around that time, took to the regulations and whatever we could find out there about aviation security, and converted them to a “text.” Most of what was available focused on Pan Am 103 and solving a threat that was nearly 15 years old at the time. But, this was a chance to maybe make a difference in the way our industry approached aviation security.

Also in 2003, I was asked by the American Association of Airport Executives to take over as their Airport Security Coordinator trainer, which I did. Both requests, Metro and AAAE, set me on a path to where I am today. The ASC training led to the development of the Airport Certified Employee-Security program, a 3-day sort of ASC experts course, that I have now revised twice since 2004 and have certified over 200 individuals. I’ve also now trained over 1,000 ASC’s.

The ACE-Security program led to the textbook, Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. I was able to literally travel the globe, studying El Al security measures and at Ben Gurion International Airport, London’s Heathrow Airport, airports in Canada, Japan, Ireland and nearly every large commercial service airport in the United States. I studied with airline security coordinators, TSA personnel, old-school FAA security personnel, industry experts such as Rafi Ron and Phillip Baum, and airline, law enforcement and airport professionals throughout the world.

We are moving towards the second edition of the book – it’s scheduled to come out in 2013. Contracts are signed and I’d best stop procrastinating on it and get to writing. I’m looking forward to the second edition even more than the first. The first book opened so many doors to a world of security professionals and practices and I expect you’ll see some major changes, with some new focus on operational security, an expanded role for intelligence and law enforcement entities and a completely revised air cargo section.

Unfortunately, even today there are few collegiate aviation programs that teach aviation security. While some students now desire to get into the aviation security industry, the discipline is still very young and I expect it will take another decade to really build momentum. The challenge is that the farther we are between attacks on aviation, the more people forget – which is what happened on 9/11/01. We forgot to secure our nation’s airways because it hadn’t happened in awhile. Kind of like a city failing to be prepared for a major hurricane because it hadn’t happened in awhile.

I feel good that emergency management and aviation and homeland security programs continue to be developed and grow. While attacks on aviation, and major natural disasters are few and far between, they also can result in the loss of life and immense property and economic damage that need not occur through some simple training, mitigation and preparedness steps.

I’m sometimes asked (accused would probably be more accurate) of capitalizing on the tragedy of 9/11. Some have inquired, usually at slightly beyond arm’s length, that, ‘gee, so if 9/11 had never happened, you probably wouldn’t have a job, would you?’

The answer is no, I wouldn’t have THIS job. I’d probably be a motivational speaker by now. I didn’t seek this role. It sought me. Like a police officer, who without crime, would have to find new employment, my mission is to promote effective aviation security practices so that another 9/11 doesn’t happen. My mission is to work myself out of this job to a point where people aren’t afraid to fly because they are scared of a hijack, or bomb or surface to air missile. The mission of the Israeli self-defense practice of Krav Maga is ‘so one may walk in peace,’ I guess my mission is ‘so one may fly in peace.’

The screams of anguish I’ve heard from family members who have lost loved ones in terrorist attacks, whether that’s Lockerbie, or 9/11 or any act of air terror, tear at my heart and fuel my motivation to prevent others from having to experience that same grief. I love this industry and I love flying. Since 9/11, I not only routinely fly commercially, I got back in the cockpit myself and am once again an general aviation active pilot. I will continue to be an advocate for best aviation security practices through my teaching, training and writing.

Al-Qaeda “tweets” a panic attack

2011 September 5 by leadingedgestrategies

What does a woman in Mexico tweeting about non-existent school shooting attacks and a government warning about a plot by al-Qaeda to use small, explosives filled aircraft to attack U.S. targets, have in common? They are both efforts to create fear and panic, and to cause us to spend more money to chase our tails.

Click here for story.

Industry reps tell me that the neither the FBI nor DHS have issued guidance or warnings about this latest threat and from the language of the L.A. Times article, it reads similar to previous threats from General Aviation that have been issued.

In the Mexico City incident, individuals falsely tweeted about schools being attacked by gunmen, sending many people into a panic that shut down emergency telephone lines. In the “GA Threats” article, al Qaeda may be trying to achieve the same panic effect. Just by sending out some information that a plan to use GA explosives-laden aircraft to attack U.S. targets is in the works, or even the final stages, while likely not to cause widespread panic, adds to the overall fear factor. It may just fuel a community fire or political fires to put more regulations and restrictions on the GA industry, which alone adds $100 billion in economic impact to the United States.

While regulating general aviation aircraft, or causing higher security requirements (and thus, more cash to be spent) on “securing” general aviation may seem to be a small inconvenience to those outside of the GA industry, it’s one more expense, it’s one more “fear” for us to worry about, it’s one more pinprick, that is slowly eroding our economy and our civil rights.

In 1776 a group of individuals signed a Declaration of Independence. That document proclaimed freedom from oppression. At the time, the oppression was from a specific source. The Declaration though did not come with an expiration date, nor was it specific to one entity doing the oppression. It was a declaration from all forms of oppression, including al Qaeda and any other group or individual that seeks to deny our God given right to choose our destiny.

TSA wants to talk to you

2011 August 29 by leadingedgestrategies

It’s too early to tell if TSA’s new approach to behavior detection will work. Click here for full story.

Unfortunately, the United States has a history of taking something that works really well, adapts it, but not without taking out the thing that made it effective in the first place. Hopefully, this will not be the story with TSA’s new approach.

TSA rolled out the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) a couple of years ago. This was largely an observation based process where the TSA looked for people exhibiting suspicious behavior. This advanced to the more formalized Behavior Detection Officers (BDO’s) program. This program trained Transportation Security Officers (TSO’s, more commonly known as screeners), for a couple of weeks, whereby the TSO was trained to spot eight different types of emotions – this process has been well covered by Paul Eckman’s research and in fact, it was Eckman’s microexpressions upon which the BDO program is based.

However, passive observation can only go so far. People at airports can display a variety of emotions, none of which have anything to do with criminal behavior. Anger or resentment? Maybe it’s todays friendly airline experience, not the willingness to do something bad.

This is a good example of taking something that works somewhere else, in this case Israel, the United Kingdom and many of the countries of the European Union, defanging it, then still telling everyone it’s a vicious dog. We’ve done this before in fact. In 1986, when Israeli security personnel stopped Anne Marie Murphy from getting a bomb on an El Al flight, U.S. FAA officials thought it sounded like a pretty good idea and implemented it here in the States. However, instead of using trained security personnel to do the questioning, they tasked airline ticket agent personnel and provided them zero training in identifying suspicious behavior. These questions would continue to be used until after 9/11/01 and to date, I don’t think any terrorist was caught using this technique.

Based on Administrator Pistole’s general approach to security, I would guess that the new program more closely emulates the Israeli model. What is difficult to determine is whether the program will actually catch anyone? My guess? Probably not at first. Well, it may grab up some morons with outstanding warrants, a few illegal immigrants and your local gentry who are already in trouble with the law. But a terrorist? Don’t count on it.

Think for a moment. If you were a terrorist, would you try to go through the airport where they are testing new security techniques, particularly those that are very difficult to bypass? No. The thinking terrorist will avoid this airport and others, and wait until the Court of Public Opinion weighs in. Let GAO publish a report saying that the TSA hasn’t caught anything, then maybe toss in a local lawsuit from someone who thinks they’ve been unfairly profiled. Then maybe public pressure and a lack of measurable results will push the TSA away.

What should happen is that the program is fairly assessed – as fairly as you can assess a program that’s designed to both deter and detect criminal activity, and the program should be expanded and implemented as part of the normal security process. Maybe one day it catches the next Anne Marie Murphy – or maybe it just deters the bad guys in which case, it’s effective, we just don’t know it.

Airport crime statistics are questionable

2011 July 26 by leadingedgestrategies

USAToday (click for the story) reported that crime outside of airports is higher than other areas of many cities. However, I take issue with the listing that Denver International Airport received. Check out the list here.

Denver International Airport received a ranking of 421, beating out San Diego and Los Angeles International Airport. I’ve spent time training employees at both airports, SAN and LAX, and helped open DEN when I worked there. I’ve stayed at the hotels right out the front gate of LAX, which is right down the street from Watts and Compton, and I’m befuddled that Denver gets a higher crime ranking.

Apparently, this was a computer generated statistic, without reality involved in the equation. I would like to know what high crime area around Denver International Airport was surveyed. First, the airport sits on the plains, surrounded by miles and miles of miles. The nearest subdivisions are a good 15 minute drive from the airport and the hotel area, a 10 minute drive from the airport, is not a high crime area. There is a high crime area, but it’s about 15 minutes west of the airport, and your normal airport traveler wouldn’t be wandering off into that area.

Now, let’s compare this to LAX – which, by it’s location is a higher crime area. I’ve taken frequent walks from my hotel, which is usually the Courtyard Marriott, right at the big L-A-X letters at the airport entrance, to the 24hr Fitness center, about 3 blocks away, and I’ve walked even farther east to some of the eating establishments. I’m personally on high alert during these walks, particularly at night because it is a high crime area. However, I’d walk from DIA, all the day to Interstate 70, which is a 9 mile hike, and the only violence I’d be worried about is getting hit by a speeding car on Pena Boulevard.

Please take lists like this with a huge dose of salt. I’ve personally been to every airport on the list and in some cases, like Philadelphia, there’s probably some good justification there. But in many of these cases, it seems the compute has taken a nearby subdivision, that no traveler would ever go to unless they are lost and used its statistics to prove their point, erroneously.