Leading Edge Strategies

Ideology Dies Hard, maybe we need Bruce Willis

2011 November 23 by leadingedgestrategies

Ever notice in all the Die Hard movies that once the bad guys are dead, they stay dead? They don’t continue to inspire hundreds if not thousands of others? Too bad movies don’t imitate real life.

For the past few years, YouTube has been the place for those really upset with society to get their terrorist freak on. Fortunately, the propaganda machine was hit with the heavy sledge hammer on the day that YouTube Star and Chief Motivational Officer (CMO?) for al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan had Hellfire missile for breakfast. But I guess there are a few previously inspired nutjobs still out there.

The recent arrest of Jose Pimentel, suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S. demonstrates the power of the spoken word and the threat posed by those who not only inspire violence, but provide information on how to carry out such attacks. This model is not without precedent – it is well known now that Timothy McVeigh was inspired by the Turner Diaries, to carry out his attack on Murrah Building. Now, being a writer, I’m the last one to dress down our 1st amendment right to free speech, but every writer should realize that what you write, sometimes has power and influence. I guess if you’re going to yell fire in a crowded theater, when there’s no fire, don’t be surprised when someone pops you one. Remember Salman Rushdie?

The power of the Lone Wolf nor the propaganda ministers, should not be ignored. While large scale attacks, such as the Mumbai active shooter assaults, the train bombings in Madrid and the subway and bus bombings in London, along with 9/11, are devastating, hundreds have been killed by a lone wolf. The downing of PSA Flight 1771 in 1987 was by a distraught airline employee as just one for instance. The bombings of numerous aircraft throughout aviation’s history were carried out by a single person.

The Lone Wolf attacks seem to be ramping up. It’s apparently getting harder for the bad guys to put together a large-scale attack, but consider if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called “underwear bomber,” or Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, had been successful. Hundreds would have perished, and the response from Congress and Homeland Security would have cost billions more to the U.S. economy and eroded more of our personal freedoms and way of life.

While we have been worried about the large scale attacks, we should not lose focus on the Lone Wolf. The Lone Wolf is harder to detect – he or she lives among us and moves throughout our society with less suspicion. Operational security is easier to maintain when the Lone Wolf keeps his mouth shut, as compared to 19 people, their handlers and trainers, and support personnel, trying to keep their mouths shut. The Lone Wolf, when properly motivated, carries out his or her mission, rather than, as in the case of one of the 9/11 hijackers, who began to lose heart because he had a wife and child to live for. The Lone Wolf is a one-and-done operation, which are among the hardest to defeat.

What will stop the Lone Wolf? The first step is to eliminate the motivators and opportunities for training. The killing of a Anwar al-Awlaki and the editor of Inspire magazine, Samir Khan, is a victory for the good guys. Both used the power of social media to influence the masses, just as Hitler and others controlled the media in order to ensure only approved messages were sent forth. Inspire magazine provided blueprints for creating bombs and carrying out attacks. While similar “instructional” documents are available on the Internet, consider that much of what is on the Internet, isn’t accurate enough to stake your life on. Just ask any academic or researcher.

Most of the Lone Wolf attacks that have been recently thwarted have been the result of good investigative and intelligence work. This layer of aviation security cannot be underestimated. While the focus is always on the screening checkpoint, the reality is that the checkpoint is near the FINAL point of failure of the system – it’s better to stop the attack in the initial phases.

Other Lone Wolf preventative measures include, as I’ve always encouraged, good workplace violence training and being aware of your surroundings and the people you come into contact with. Lone Wolves exhibit signs far ahead of time, that they are disenfranchised – not like everyone else in the U.S. workforce, but enough to take violent action. While we all may despise working for “the Man,” there are those who have decided that their lot in life is really someone else’s fault, and they find inspiration and instruction on YouTube and in the pages of terrorist publications.

While the recent deaths of bin Laden, al-Awlaki and their ilk, have struck a blow for justice, there always seems to be someone coming along to take their place. Their influence has extended beyond their years here among the living, and continue to inspire others. There will be others. There will always be others. It’s not time to let the guard down. Bruce Willis’ enemies may die hard, but ideology dies hardest.

This has been a test of the aviation security system

2010 August 31 by leadingedgestrategies

Remember when the Emergency Broadcast System would do those tests on TV? They still do from time to time, but without the threat of being annihilated by Soviet ballistic missiles, we don’t seem then much anymore. However, terrorists and bad guys continue to conduct tests of aviation security, and they just did another one. Click here for details.

When two men were apprehended in Amsterdam after traveling from Birmingham, AL to Chicago and Dulles, were found to have several items such as cell phones, watches, liquid bottles and box cutters taped together in their checked luggage your first thought should be that they were testing the aviation security in preparation for a future attack. Whether they were testing for a future bombing or hijacking attempt or just to be stupid, it was still a test.

The fact that there were air marshals on the flight increases the likelihood that not only was this a test but that the U.S. government may have already known about these guys and were tracking their movements. While the FAM’s don’t release statistics on how many air marshals are out there, the numbers are too few for it to be a coincidence that they were on the same flight.

The items themselves are not prohibited in checked luggage. However, the manner in which they were found is suspicious. Additionally, not a lot of people toss their cell phones into their checked bag. Most passengers take their cell phones everywhere. If the TSA was aware of the individuals and ensured that air marshals were on the flight to monitor their behavior, then the system likely worked. It’s a process known as authorize-and-monitor (sometimes called “approve-and-monitor”), where suspected bad guys are allowed to continue about their business but are kept under surveillance. The process is used when someone hasn’t done something bad yet, and therefore can’t be arrested (yet), or when the good guys hope the bad guy will unknowingly provide them more information about a planned operation. For it to work, the bad guys can’t know they are being tracked.

The “underwear bomber” from last Christmas showed that terrorists are still interested in attacking aviation. Past history shows that terrorists rarely deviate too far from the playbook that has made them successful, unless those past avenues of attack are completely closed off. In other words, if bombing a flight worked before, the same methods will continue to be used until enough protections are put into place to deter that type of attack from working again. Liquids, box cutters, cell phones which can be used to trigger an improvised explosive device, are items that we are looking for. It makes sense that the bad guys will try to determine how effective we are at detecting them before trying an attack using such items.

What also makes this odd is the box cutters. Passengers cannot access checked bags during flight. It seems that these items were carefully constructed to attract the attention of screeners. If they would have gotten through, that’s valuable information for the bad guys. If they are caught, that is just as valuable information for the bad guys.

I have received various information about the bad guys testing our aviation security systems. I have heard that U.S. airport plans and maps have been found in terrorist hideouts Afghanistan. While I cannot confirm this myself, I consider my sources to be competent and accurate. Make no mistake — this was a test or dry run. Aviation will continue to be attacked — the 9/11 attacks will turn 9 years old soon and although we’ve made great strides, we have not turned terrorists away from aviation as a target. Let’s remember that while rail, bus and other forms of transportation must also be protected, aviation is how we move in this country. It’s our Achilles heel.

It will be interesting to see the facts of this case come out. In the Times Square bomber and the Christmas Day bomber the attackers own incompetence ensured a tragedy did not happen. It would be nice to see if the fact show that we actually caught these guys on a dry run or system test through our own competence.

Smokes on a Plane

2010 April 8 by leadingedgestrategies

Keeping in mind that the news reports are still coming in, let’s talk about what we know so far about the smokes-on-a-plane story developing at Denver International Airport.

From what has been reported it appears that a Qatari man, possibly a diplomat, was arrested after making a comment about trying to light his shoe on fire, after he was caught smoking in the lavatory (facts are still trickling in). With Richard Reid, the notorious shoe bomber of 2001 who is responsible for making us all wear clean socks when we fly and the Christmas underwear bomber still on our minds, authorities responded as they should have. You take this situation seriously.

Granted, the news stations are devoting a ton of time to this, but maybe it’s just a slow news day. The reality is this: (a) you don’t make jokes about bombs on a plane or in the airport; (b) the FBI should take this seriously because you never know if this is a test-run by a criminal or terrorist element, and even if it isn’t, those elements are watching carefully how authorities are responding; (c) it looks like DIA is doing things right, as opposed to the Christmas bomb incident which was rife with miscommunications and missteps in the airline and airport responses.

Once notified of the threat, F-16′s were scrambled and the plane landed quickly and was moved to an isolated parking position. It did NOT go to the main terminal as did the Northwest flight on Christmas. The isolated parking position is inline with ICAO protocols and keeps the terminal safe if there really is a bomb on the plane. Also, putting the plane in the IPP helps authorities control the scene.

Passengers are being interviewed, bags and the airplane are searched by explosive detection entities — two other things that did not happen when they should have in Detroit. At the end of the day, this may turn out to be nothing but a good exercise for TSA, FBI, DIA and United Airlines personnel in a bomb threat, but we don’t know that. It should be treated as serious as an actual threat until it’s confirmed that it is not.

Jihadists continue to look for aviation security weaknesses

2010 February 18 by leadingedgestrategies

According to a CBS news report Jihadists continue to attempt to exploit gaps in aviation security. One website invites members to post methods of circumventing aviation security and how to bypass screening, while others ask about the capabilities of screening detection equipment.

On one site a visitor asks a question involving the whole body imagers: “Can I refuse [to pass through] for religious reasons?” Ironically (or not), this comes on the heels of a Muslim Fatwa (religious order) that called upon the faithful to not go through body scanners because the scholars said the machines violate Islamic rules on nudity. Click here for more information.

Also found on a website is a TSA document discussing the rules for searching passengers.

Combine this with the Christmas bombing attempt and what all this goes to show is that aviation remains a target for terrorists. Aviation provides media coverage, scares the public, draws attention to the Jihadists cause, allows them to better recruit and damages the nation’s economy — everything terrorism desires can be achieved when you attack aviation.

Semper Vigilantes (Always Vigilant).

Rx for Aviation Security

2010 January 8 by leadingedgestrategies

In recent interviews on Denver’s Fox 31 News and on 9News, I tried to answer the most commonly asked question whenever there is a security incident: “How can we improve the system?” A good follow up question to that is: “At what point does all this security just cost too much?” The answers to both of these questions are interrelated.

At some point, security will cost too much. It will cost too much money, too much time and too much of a compromise of our civil rights. The solution is to improve the system through a strategy of reducing the number of people that we our looking at.

Whole Body Imagers can be effective but they take up a lot of space, may need stronger floors to sit upon and there may be additional power requirements. To replace all of the metal detectors in the U.S. will be costly in terms of both money and security wait times.

Advanced x-ray machines are being deployed and testing is being conducted on using EDS machines at the passenger screening checkpoints. Again, this is all expensive technology and still doesn’t address the fundamental issue, which is, let’s look at those people who really should be looked at and with additional scrutiny, rather than treating everyone the same in terms of a security threat.

Passenger screening checkpoints should be a mix of technologies that have lesser detection capabilities and those technologies that have higher detection capabilities. The “lesser” machines are used to screen those passengers who, through pre-clearance when they book their flight, the travel document check and through behavior profiling are deemed low risk threats. The “higher” machines are used for those individuals that are deemed (through the aforementioned processes) high risk threats.

We do not need to keep screening every piece of hay in the haystack looking for the needle. It’s expensive in every sense. We need to sift through the hay first, with layered, proven processes that identify those pieces that may be needles, then test them with technology to be sure. That is how you implement effective security without putting the costs through the sky.

Getting it right, getting it wrong

2010 January 7 by leadingedgestrategies

It seems that Rep. John Mica has joined the opposition to the appointment of Erroll Southers to the head of TSA. Mica is criticizing what he perceives is Southers lack of executive management experience. Among rumors that Southers was nominated only after more qualified candidates passed on the opportunity as being unwilling or reluctant to serve, Mica is blasting both Southers position on collective bargaining for TSA screeners and what he calls Southers “second-tier” leadership experience.

Meanwhile, an article ran today on The Daily Breeze.com addressing measures the Los Angeles International Airport is taking to increase security. LAX has been one of the airports on the forefront of aviation security taking additional measures, studying counterterrorism methods and employing them where appropriate. Did I mention that Erroll Southers is from LAX!

After hearing Erroll lecture to a classroom full of airport security coordinator trainees in a class I was training last June in Los Angeles, I was immediately impressed with his poise, knowledge and learned perspectives on aviation and transportation security.

What TSA needs is not another career bureaucrat who specializes in distorting the truth and climbing the Beltway career ladder. They need someone from outside to come in and get things done by implementing effective transportation security measures. They need Southers.

Who is responsible for airline security?

2010 January 6 by leadingedgestrategies

Ask virtually anyone on the street “who is responsible for airline security,” and the answer will most likely be, “TSA.” Unfortunately, it’s not that simple and could mean that airlines will have to pay more and take on more security responsibilities for their international flights.

While TSA sets forth and enforces the regulations, there are many players and many layers within the aviation security system, and it’s important to know who’s who and what’s what because it could make a difference in the security of the plane you’re on.

Recently, after the failed Christmas bombing, TSA dished out several security procedures to airlines and airports, such as passengers being required to remain seated during the last hour of flight. Just as quickly, they decided that the airlines and the pilot on board could make these types of security calls. Now, TSA says that extra screening is required in certain countries before passengers are allowed to board a U.S. registered aircraft, but the international community has been slow to respond (click link). Guess they didn’t get the memo that we are in charge.

Regardless, this has brought forth the question, who is really responsible for airline and airport security. If the pilot on a particular flight elected not to tell the passengers to remain in their seats and something bad happens during this time, is it now the airline’s fault? Should we blame the pilot and sue the airline? I’m not sure that’s what we want. The pilot-in-command (i.e. the Captain) has pretty much always had the authority as the In-Flight Security Coordinator to make decisions along these lines if he or she felt it was in the legitimate interest of the safety of the flight. Not sure about this authority??? Just try standing up to go the lav when the Fasten Seat Belt light is on.

Under the Transportation Security Regulations, Title 49 Part 1544.201 Acceptance and Screening of Individuals and Accessible Property, the airline is the final authority on whether a person boards their flight. The airline is required to show that the proper screening has taken place or that other measures were used to determine that those allowed on board have been properly screened through other measures.

Since the international community has been reluctant to jump on the latest TSA mandates, does this mean that the airlines may soon have to provide their own additional security staff and take additional measures? Maybe?

Back in the late 1960s, the airlines started their own security processes because they were getting hijacked a lot and that was just bad for business. Then, in 1973, Congress made it official that the airlines were responsible for providing screening but the FAA would provide oversight and set the standards. That system stayed in place through 9/11/01.

In 1996, the Gore Commission acknowledged that aviation was so important  to the United States that aviation security is a national issue, not just an airport or airline responsibility. It was partially based on that declaration that TSA was created and took over screening functions in the U.S. after 9/11. However, that’s about where everything stopped. Beyond that point, the airlines are still responsible for ensuring that people getting on board have been properly screened and airports are still responsible for another whole host of measures — all of this largely unfunded by the Federal government. While TSA does provide air marshals, if you look at what some other airlines do throughout the world, the airline themselves provides armed airline security officers to protect their flights. Since that costs a lot of money we decided to give guns to the pilots. Maybe we should give the flight attendants better security training and arm some of them – make them actual armed security officers, similar to the Armed Security Officer program in use for corporate aviation flights into Reagan National Airport. Bet you’d really think twice about violating the Fasten Seat Belt sign warning.

I’m not suggesting that airlines actually do this or take on more responsibility, such as screening functions at foreign airports or other measures. I’m also not saying those are bad ideas. What I am saying is that maybe it’s time to re-look at our national priorities with aviation security and see if the system is set up to actually protect the traveling public, or just set up to limit the government’s liability and provide the illusion of security.

Stay tuned on this one, it’s a thought in progress.

Fixing the System

2009 December 29 by leadingedgestrategies

As more and more news reports begin to come out about this incident, along with the inevitable “what needs fixing,” stories, let’s take a look at what really needs fixing.

The No-Fly and TIDE List

TIDE is the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center and is a repository of information on international terrorist identities. According to a recent press report, there are about 550,000 people on the TIDE list, 14,000 on the Selectee and 4,000 on the no-fly (click here for source).

We need to continue initial efforts by TSA to clean up the no-fly and selectee list. The fact that this guy wasn’t on the no-fly list may just be an indication that he had not done enough previously to warrant being placed on the list. To screen everyone on the TIDE list however, will take more time and may potentially let the bad guys know that they are on the list. Sometimes, in law enforcement and intelligence, it’s not good to let the hunted, know they are being hunted.

Deployment of Whole Body Imagers

In a House vote in June of 2009, conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats banded together, 310 to 118, to ban use of WBI machines for primary screening. This is indicative of where our country is at with aviation security, eight years after 9/11. We’re forgetting that aviation is a target. I’ve been through these machines. The imagery is not nude-image quality and no one who is viewing the imagery even knows that it’s you that’s in the machine. Don’t worry, you won’t be on the cover of Maxim magazine after getting into one of these machines.

It’s time to deploy these machines and let it be optional for those that don’t want to go through them. No problem, we’ll screen the majority with body imagers and metal detectors and then screen those few that are opposed to the WBI’s, with trace detection, pat-downs and other methods.

Why do I say both body imagers AND metal detectors, even though metal detectors don’t detect explosives? Because the WBI’s are large, expensive and take more time, and more space in a screening area. The screening checkpoint needs to be an area where security officers observe and sometimes question certain passengers they deem to be higher risk, through behavior detection, or who have flagged on a travel document check or other suspicious indicator, then they are then assigned to a level of screening commensurate with the risk presented.

Another consideration that has been mentioned about the WBI’s is that terrorist will start hiding the explosives inside their bodies, similar to drug smugglers. Well, this tactic has been attempted recently. What we understand is that the human body makes a pretty good insulator against small explosives — think of the people who have laid over hand grenades to save their friends in combat. Against large explosives, the question is “how much explosives can someone hold internally and still (a) be alive and mobile enough to conduct an attack and (b) have the device actually function?

Profiling based on Race or Nationality

I still disagree with racial profiling. It’s not effective and the bad guys will adjust as needed. They have used women and children and are known to be attempting to radicalize individuals in the U.S.. Tim McVeigh would have walked right through a racial profile using the standards some people have suggested we use. Behavioral profiling however does not involve race and is effective. Click this link for an excellent perspective on profiling and racial profiling by a very respected associate of mine, Philip Baum, editor of Aviation Security International magazine.

Silly Rules v. “Unpredictable” Processes

So now TSA is saying that it’s up to the pilot and flight attendants to decide what “security” procedures to follow. This has been tried before and doesn’t work. First, the pilot should worry about flying the plane. I’m a pilot and if I was flying a commercial airplane I don’t want to worry about which passenger is doing what. That’s the flight attendant’s job. They need to inform the pilot about suspicious or dangerous behavior, then the pilot decides whether or not to land. Flight attendant’s however should not be encumbered with trying to figure out which one of the “simon says,” security rules should be used on a given flight. They should be trained in behavior recognition and assess the threats as they identify them.

Some argue that these odd procedures are a way of keeping terrorists off balance. All it’s doing is keeping everyone in the system, pilots, flight attendants, passengers who are not a risk and may in fact actually see and spot a threat (like they did last week), dazed and confused. While we don’t give a blueprint to the terrorists, we shouldn’t confuse ourselves so much that even we don’t know what we’re doing. It reminds me of the old Cones of Silence in the Get Smart movie from the 80s. “We’re so secret, even we don’t know what we’re doing,” (that’s my quote, not from the movie).

In the past, we have tried to use airline ticket agents as security profilers. Remember thequestions: did you pack your own bag. . . ? That was a good security procedure that was poorly adopted. Want to know why? Read the book – I believe I explain it in chapter 6.

What should we watch for now?

In a recent media interview I was asked what threats to watch out for now. I think the bombing using the same methods that were used on the NW flight is definitely a threat. I’ve been saying that for 10 years and my attitude has not changed. Ask anyone who has been through one of my security classes and they will confirm this. What’s the solution? Hmm, have you been reading the blog? I’ve said it over and over.

Secondly, I believe the airport active shooter is a likely threat, particularly now with screening lines backing up and thousands of people tightly packed into a terminal awaiting screening. That makes a good target for a Mumbai, Beslan, Columbine, V-Tech style of attack. Airports should be deploying extra armed police officers to watch the public areas of the terminal and the screening checkpoints. If the checkpoints are close to the passenger loading and unloading areas, then additional police should be deployed to watch for abandoned vehicles, and profile vehicles that could be carrying explosives.

Finally, we should continue to work on securing the back door to aviation security – the employees. The Chechen Black Widows responsible for the downing of two Russian airliners in 2004 bribed airline personnel to gain access to the plane and there is a long history of attacks on aviation that were either committed by airline or airport employees or employees were complicit or aided in the attacks.

Should the Threat Level be Raised?

The color-coded alert system has come under attack quite a bit, but just look in the regs to see the Contingency Plans under 1542. Today, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is used as a barometer for airport and airline contingency plans. TSA can have airports and airlines implement a variety of additional security measures.

Some in the press have wondered why parking garage closures, vehicle searches and other security measures not seemingly related to the recent bombing attempt have to be implemented. My answer — see the aforementioned comments on new threats to airports.

Congress has ordered a review of airport and aircraft operator security. Let’s see if they pay attention to these issues, or just come up with more silly rules.

Attempted Bombing

2009 December 26 by leadingedgestrategies

The attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 brings aviation security back to center stage. The attempt of course brings many questions back to the forefront about aviation security, questions I have addressed in this blog previously. So, let’s use an interview style to address what inevitably will be questions being asked at media outlets and in political offices throughout today. Since we don’t have a lot of details right now, we’ll make some assumptions to make the points.

Q: How did the man get the bomb on the plane?

A: Despite security improvements, most passengers still only pass through a walk thru metal detector, not an “explosives detector.” The metal detector does what it says on the box, it detects metal. Concealing bomb making materials on the body is not inconceivable, and as long as they are not metal, they likely won’t be detected, at least not by that technology.

Q: Is this the first attempt at a suicide bombing of an aircraft?

A: Certainly not. These types of attempts go back to the 60s and 70s when people brought dynamite on board and blew themselves and the planes up. The most recent occurred in Russian in 2004 when two terrorists brought down two Russian airliners using explosives allegedly strapped to themselves.

Q: Why was this man allowed to fly?

A: From what we know so far, he was not on a no-fly list. A dangerous tactic is called “one and done.” This means you take an individual with a very clean background, arm, train and prepare them for an attack and send them on their mission. There is no prior criminal activity to make anyone suspicious of them. They do their attack – they either die, are arrested or succeed (and still sometimes die), or they escape. Additionally, there is a “triage” of sorts with respect to putting people on the Selectee or No-Fly List. Some people may be suspicious or perhaps their cell phone number came up associated with a known bad guy so they are on a list, but not the n0-fly.

Q: Why didn’t screening catch this? Is this a failure of the system?

A: Screening does not catch everything. It’s just impossible to have 100% security. It’s about deterrence and making it as difficult as possible. I recall what former Senator Gary Hart once said about aviation security after 9/11: “No one believes in absolute security. But the goal is to make it as difficult for the attackers as possible, and we had not done that.”

Think about protecting your home. Most of us agree that regardless of security measures, such as leaving your lights on, getting a mean dog and an alarm system, etc., if someone wanted to, they could still defeat the measures and break into your house. You are trying to make it as difficult as possible in the hopes they will decide not to rob YOUR house and go somewhere else. We need to continue to focus on deterrence and making it as difficult as possible to attack aviation.

Q: What can be done about preventing this type of attack in the future?

A: For an immediate solution, TSA has already implemented some good measures such as deploying K-9 to the checkpoints and conducting more random screening and increased inspections. These improvements need to continue. The Israelis can run K-9 teams on a consistent basis, rotating three dogs 20 minutes on, 40 minutes off per hour. We need more and more dogs. They are a visible deterrent and an effective defense.

For a long term solution, after the 2004 Russian airliner bombings, TSA deployed portal trace detection equipment (known as “puffers”) that do detect explosives. However, their use was limited to secondary screening only as they are not as fast as a metal detector, nor are they currently as resilient. TSA has been deploying the Whole Body Imaging technology, which would likely have detected a device or elements of a device hidden on the individual. Again though, these are only used for secondary screening as they do take longer than a metal detector and there are privacy rights groups that are in opposition to the technology. Regardless the deployment needs to be accelerated.

Q: What does this mean for the future for air travel?

A: As we’ve done in years past, the farther away we get from the last incident, the less we remember why we’re implementing all of these security measures. This brings the issues back to center stage. We need to continue to do what we’ve done. We’re heading in a good direction and need to keep the momentum. What TSA will do from here is learn from the experience. TSA bomb appraisal officers already invent new types of potential explosive devices for screeners to see and learn from, and this will likely be a good case study, which will make it harder for the next attacker to succeed.

We don’t have to panic. The system is working and continues to work. Improvements continue to be made. What does need to occur is the continued deployment of better screening equipment, continued deployment of behavior detection personnel and continued focus on aviation security – we can’t lose sight of our goal as obviously, the bad guys haven’t lost sight of aviation as a target.

Q: Anything else?

A: The confirmation of Erroll Southers to head TSA. His appointment has been stalled for political reasons. The organization needs leadership and has been leaderless for a year. Erroll has outstanding qualifications and needs to be confirmed quickly. He should then turn attention to more inspections of U.S. air carrier operations overseas to ensure our flights are getting the security protection they need.

I applaud the passengers on the flight, who today, are an integral part of security and their own protection. We all need to take more responsibility for our own actions rather than waiting for big brother to protect us. If a passenger sees something suspicious, they need to notify someone or take action.

UPDATED:

Q: What do you think about the new security rules about passengers not being allowed to move during the last hour of flight, or being able to have anything on their laps during that time?

A: My first reaction is that this is acting without thinking. Unless there is something I’m missing here, what’s the difference between the last hour of flight from every other hour of flight? I mean, what’s the point? If this guy had attempted his bombing during the middle of the flight, would the new security procedure to be to make everyone stay in their seat during that particular hour? This hurts aviation without adding a security benefit.

Besides the increasing inconvenience to air travelers, restricting passengers from activities during the last hour and discouraging travelers from carry-on bags, limits the time and ability of business travelers to do business. A lot of the airline industry is still supported by the business traveler — continuing to push business travelers to other options, such as webcams and private aircraft will soon result in increasing commercial airfares for everyone else.

We need to remember the lessons of the bomb plots that were thwarted in London in 2006 that led to the liquid ban. When U.K. authorities required passengers to check all carry-on bags, that led to a huge disruption for business travelers and increased theft rates as airline employees and screeners went shopping through the checked bags for cell phones, laptops, iPods, you name it. Laptop theft also results in identity theft and the theft of corporate information.

Decisions about securing aviation as we move forward should be focussed on actually improving security, not giving the appearance of improving security, particularly when the appearance is so transparent.