Don’t hit the snooze on this alarm
2012 February 18 by leadingedgestrategies
When an alarm system is broken, you fix it, you don’t turn off the alarm. But that’s what Congressman Mike Rogers-R (Alabama) who is also the chairman of the Transportation Security Subcommittee Congressman said in a recent Bloomberg article – he believes that the terrorist threat has changed and that we should look at getting rid of the air marshal program. Was George Bernard Shaw right? Do we truly learn nothing from history?
Let’s say your house gets robbed, so you buy an alarm system. Then, you don’t get robbed again for 10 years. Should you conclude that the threat is now gone and you should get rid of the system? No, most people would logically conclude that the alarm system is what’s keeping the house from being robbed again. Then, take it a step further and post a sign in front of your house stating that the system is now inactive. How ludicrous would that be? But, it’s apparently what is now being considered.
The air marshals have had some problems recently. The solution should be to fix the problems, not get rid of this essential layer of aviation security. Air marshals were among the first responses to hijackings to ever be employed (JFK deployed them back in the early 1960s to deter hijackings). Throughout history, as we’ve applied additional security measures, the air marshal program has come and gone and come and gone – and every time it goes away we pay the price. In fact, nearly 3,000 people paid the price on 9/11 when we decided back in the 80s, that the hijacking threat was essentially gone and we should just focus on bombs.
While you cannot point to defeated terrorist attacks or hijacks attempts as a result of the air marshals, I can almost guarantee without them, the terrorists will have renewed resolve that they can once again use hijackings as a weapon in their arsenal.
What are we thinking? Is the thought that passengers will suddenly rise up against an attempted hijacking – against knife-wielding bad guys, maybe, but it’s short-sighted to think that the next hijacking will look like the last one. It will probably not. In fact, the next hijacking may have hijackers with pistols, IED’s and submachine guns that have been smuggled on board by airline or catering employees – it’s a tactic that’s been used frequently in the past and why should the terrorists not return to what’s worked for them in the past? Do we really want to bring guts and skin to a gunfight, and also tell the bad guys that there is NO chance an air marshal will be on board?
Air marshals should be here to stay. They are part of an integrated, layered security system – and if there aren’t any attempted hijackings on their watch, then maybe they are doing their job. Take them away, and I can almost guarantee the bad guys will break out the old blueprints and start planning the next 9/11. This is one alarm system we don’t want to hit the snooze on.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-17/air-marshals-cost-effectiveness-questioned-by-u-s-house.html
Ideology Dies Hard, maybe we need Bruce Willis
2011 November 23 by leadingedgestrategies
Ever notice in all the Die Hard movies that once the bad guys are dead, they stay dead? They don’t continue to inspire hundreds if not thousands of others? Too bad movies don’t imitate real life.
For the past few years, YouTube has been the place for those really upset with society to get their terrorist freak on. Fortunately, the propaganda machine was hit with the heavy sledge hammer on the day that YouTube Star and Chief Motivational Officer (CMO?) for al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan had Hellfire missile for breakfast. But I guess there are a few previously inspired nutjobs still out there.
The recent arrest of Jose Pimentel, suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S. demonstrates the power of the spoken word and the threat posed by those who not only inspire violence, but provide information on how to carry out such attacks. This model is not without precedent – it is well known now that Timothy McVeigh was inspired by the Turner Diaries, to carry out his attack on Murrah Building. Now, being a writer, I’m the last one to dress down our 1st amendment right to free speech, but every writer should realize that what you write, sometimes has power and influence. I guess if you’re going to yell fire in a crowded theater, when there’s no fire, don’t be surprised when someone pops you one. Remember Salman Rushdie?
The power of the Lone Wolf nor the propaganda ministers, should not be ignored. While large scale attacks, such as the Mumbai active shooter assaults, the train bombings in Madrid and the subway and bus bombings in London, along with 9/11, are devastating, hundreds have been killed by a lone wolf. The downing of PSA Flight 1771 in 1987 was by a distraught airline employee as just one for instance. The bombings of numerous aircraft throughout aviation’s history were carried out by a single person.
The Lone Wolf attacks seem to be ramping up. It’s apparently getting harder for the bad guys to put together a large-scale attack, but consider if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called “underwear bomber,” or Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, had been successful. Hundreds would have perished, and the response from Congress and Homeland Security would have cost billions more to the U.S. economy and eroded more of our personal freedoms and way of life.
While we have been worried about the large scale attacks, we should not lose focus on the Lone Wolf. The Lone Wolf is harder to detect – he or she lives among us and moves throughout our society with less suspicion. Operational security is easier to maintain when the Lone Wolf keeps his mouth shut, as compared to 19 people, their handlers and trainers, and support personnel, trying to keep their mouths shut. The Lone Wolf, when properly motivated, carries out his or her mission, rather than, as in the case of one of the 9/11 hijackers, who began to lose heart because he had a wife and child to live for. The Lone Wolf is a one-and-done operation, which are among the hardest to defeat.
What will stop the Lone Wolf? The first step is to eliminate the motivators and opportunities for training. The killing of a Anwar al-Awlaki and the editor of Inspire magazine, Samir Khan, is a victory for the good guys. Both used the power of social media to influence the masses, just as Hitler and others controlled the media in order to ensure only approved messages were sent forth. Inspire magazine provided blueprints for creating bombs and carrying out attacks. While similar “instructional” documents are available on the Internet, consider that much of what is on the Internet, isn’t accurate enough to stake your life on. Just ask any academic or researcher.
Most of the Lone Wolf attacks that have been recently thwarted have been the result of good investigative and intelligence work. This layer of aviation security cannot be underestimated. While the focus is always on the screening checkpoint, the reality is that the checkpoint is near the FINAL point of failure of the system – it’s better to stop the attack in the initial phases.
Other Lone Wolf preventative measures include, as I’ve always encouraged, good workplace violence training and being aware of your surroundings and the people you come into contact with. Lone Wolves exhibit signs far ahead of time, that they are disenfranchised – not like everyone else in the U.S. workforce, but enough to take violent action. While we all may despise working for “the Man,” there are those who have decided that their lot in life is really someone else’s fault, and they find inspiration and instruction on YouTube and in the pages of terrorist publications.
While the recent deaths of bin Laden, al-Awlaki and their ilk, have struck a blow for justice, there always seems to be someone coming along to take their place. Their influence has extended beyond their years here among the living, and continue to inspire others. There will be others. There will always be others. It’s not time to let the guard down. Bruce Willis’ enemies may die hard, but ideology dies hardest.
TSA wants to talk to you
2011 August 29 by leadingedgestrategies
It’s too early to tell if TSA’s new approach to behavior detection will work. Click here for full story.
Unfortunately, the United States has a history of taking something that works really well, adapts it, but not without taking out the thing that made it effective in the first place. Hopefully, this will not be the story with TSA’s new approach.
TSA rolled out the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) a couple of years ago. This was largely an observation based process where the TSA looked for people exhibiting suspicious behavior. This advanced to the more formalized Behavior Detection Officers (BDO’s) program. This program trained Transportation Security Officers (TSO’s, more commonly known as screeners), for a couple of weeks, whereby the TSO was trained to spot eight different types of emotions – this process has been well covered by Paul Eckman’s research and in fact, it was Eckman’s microexpressions upon which the BDO program is based.
However, passive observation can only go so far. People at airports can display a variety of emotions, none of which have anything to do with criminal behavior. Anger or resentment? Maybe it’s todays friendly airline experience, not the willingness to do something bad.
This is a good example of taking something that works somewhere else, in this case Israel, the United Kingdom and many of the countries of the European Union, defanging it, then still telling everyone it’s a vicious dog. We’ve done this before in fact. In 1986, when Israeli security personnel stopped Anne Marie Murphy from getting a bomb on an El Al flight, U.S. FAA officials thought it sounded like a pretty good idea and implemented it here in the States. However, instead of using trained security personnel to do the questioning, they tasked airline ticket agent personnel and provided them zero training in identifying suspicious behavior. These questions would continue to be used until after 9/11/01 and to date, I don’t think any terrorist was caught using this technique.
Based on Administrator Pistole’s general approach to security, I would guess that the new program more closely emulates the Israeli model. What is difficult to determine is whether the program will actually catch anyone? My guess? Probably not at first. Well, it may grab up some morons with outstanding warrants, a few illegal immigrants and your local gentry who are already in trouble with the law. But a terrorist? Don’t count on it.
Think for a moment. If you were a terrorist, would you try to go through the airport where they are testing new security techniques, particularly those that are very difficult to bypass? No. The thinking terrorist will avoid this airport and others, and wait until the Court of Public Opinion weighs in. Let GAO publish a report saying that the TSA hasn’t caught anything, then maybe toss in a local lawsuit from someone who thinks they’ve been unfairly profiled. Then maybe public pressure and a lack of measurable results will push the TSA away.
What should happen is that the program is fairly assessed – as fairly as you can assess a program that’s designed to both deter and detect criminal activity, and the program should be expanded and implemented as part of the normal security process. Maybe one day it catches the next Anne Marie Murphy – or maybe it just deters the bad guys in which case, it’s effective, we just don’t know it.
Implants and Bombs
2011 July 7 by les-admin
The latest threat to aviation security now appears to be bombs that are implanted or inserted inside the bomber. Whose to say the next buxom blonde at the checkpoint, isn’t packing bosoms that go boom? Well, let’s look at a few key points. Click here for the story.
Concealing items inside the body is not a new concept. Ask any customs agent or prison guard and either can explain the many ways the human body can be used as a hiding place for contraband. But as an explosive? Well, there was the incident in Saudi Arabia in August 2009, where a suicide bomber infiltrated security and detonated a bomb inserted in his rectum near a Saudi prince. The prince escaped with minor injuries. So, the concept is possible.
TSA has issued travel alerts that we can expect more scrutiny at checkpoints as a result of this threat, even though there is no specific threat (that they are telling us about) at the present. One perspective we do have to look at then, is the possibility that this is no more than al Qaeda propaganda sent our way intentionally to get us to overreact. Remember the printer cartridge plot out of Yemen? That cost al Qaeda about $4,000, meanwhile, we’ve spent billions trying to prevent that type of attack from happening. Not a bad return on your investment when part of your goal is to destabilize the U.S. economy (like we need help doing that – do these guys get C-Span?).
Is this just rumor, designed to get us to panic, be afraid and spend more money? There is also the question about whether the explosive, concealed inside implants, or the body, could be large enough to destroy an aircraft. Some experts feel it’s not possible, others disagree. I guess we need Mythbusters to help us out here.
But let’s assume that it is possible and that enough explosives could be concealed to bring down a plane. Will existing technology, i.e. body imagers, protect us? Yes, in some cases, body imagers can detect items inside an individual – it just depends on the machine. The body imagers come from our prison industry where they were designed to detect items concealed in the body. Also, explosive trace detection systems can be effective at determining if an individual has been handling or exposed to dangerous explosives. While it’s possible, it’s also very difficult to completely clean yourself of residue once handled. K-9 teams, in certain cases, can also detect explosives hidden within or residue left on the body.
There is another consideration. How will the device be detonated if it’s implanted? Will the detonating charge and mechanisms also be implanted? Sounds like some major surgery to me. We have to look at some basic facts. Terrorists and bad guys, who want to be successful, try to keep is simple. The more complex the attack, the more people get involved, the easier it is for things to break down and for someone to talk. There were several additional elements of the 9/11 plot that were left on the drawing table because the chance for failure was increasing with the complexity. Cargo planes were supposed to be targeted on 9/11 and at one point, Atta was pitched the idea of crashing into a nuclear facility instead of the World Trade Centers. Additional aircraft were also rumored to be hijacked on that day.
But back to the subject at hand.
I’m not as worried about implants as much as I would be concerned about a plot similar to the Saudi attack. Much easier to get someone to conceal an item in their rectum (although incredibly uncomfortable I would imagine) and attach a detonator, than to go through a highly complicated process of implanting a device.
But this leaves us with our fundamental security question: how safe do you want to be? If we start digging around in your body, are you ready to set aside your Fourth Amendment right not to be subjected to unreasonable search? Many people are – these are the “security at any costs” types who buy into the illusion that the government can prevent every bad thing from happening to them. Even after the pat-down of a 6-year-old and the diaper-gate nanny incident recently, there are still those that believe that everyone is a suspect and that no one should be exempt from scrutiny.
As General Robert E. Lee is credited with saying: “You cannot defend everything and by doing so, you will end up defending nothing.”
Maybe we need to look at this from a different perspective. Rather than buying billions in more technology to try to prevent this “next threat,” we invest heavily in our investigate and intelligence methods and personnel and attempt to stop the implant-plot before it gets out of the safe house, rather than at the last point of failure, the screening checkpoint.
Eat, drink, especially drink, and be merry
2011 February 26 by leadingedgestrategies
The country that kicked off the liquid ban seems like it’s ready to end it, at least partially. At the end of April, the European Union will allow passengers passing through Europe from a third country to carry liquids, aerosols and gels purchased either at an airport duty-free shop or on board a non-European airline. Unfortunately, the technology to scan liquids is still far from perfect. However, this reaction is not entirely surprising.
While terrorism is still a relatively new concept to American’s, 9/11 was our initiation, and nods to the Ft. Hood attack and a few failed attempts, most of us still walk the streets feeling relatively safe from terrorist attacks. However, the nations that comprise the EU, have been dealing with this issue for a long time, and they tend to approach it differently.
When the Madrid train bombings and the London bus and subway bombings occurred, the EU didn’t spend billions of dollars implementing screening checkpoints at all rail stations and subway stops. They stepped up law enforcement patrols and intensified their intelligence gathering and interdiction in the field. Then Europeans went about their business with the realization that there are risks in this world and being killed in a terrorist attack is one of many.
I’m not saying that you just accept terrorist threats as a risk of life and do nothing. However, part of any balanced approach to security is realizing that the elimination of all risk is impossible, and attempting to make anything 100% secure, achieves the very objectives of the people that are attacking us.
As George Friedman discusses in his newest book, The Next Decade (Doubleday 2011), terrorism generates fear, helplessness and rage, and transforms public opinion, which then demands a response from the government (p.77). In the past decade, this has cost a lot of money and steadily eroded a civil right here or there.
“The terrorist’s goal is to be treated as a significant threat when in fact he isn’t one…his ultimate goal is to be taken as an enormous, indeed singular threat. This creates the foundation for the political process the terrorist wants to initiate,” (Friedman, p73).
The ongoing terrorist attacks throughout the world and the continued targeting of the U.S. and particularly aviation, must be addressed with a measure of temperance so that we don’t end up destroying the industry ourselves.
The partial raising of the liquid ban, seems to be an attempt to regain some of the lost economic ground the resulted after the 2006 liquid bomb plot. Understandably, the trade associations have been active in pushing the ban, despite heavy opposition from numerous airports throughout the EU, and the U.S. TSA.
One major challenge the ban faces is the lack of harmony between the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) worldwide aviation security standards, and the U.S. aviation security standards. In ten years, we still aren’t in sync with each other, with some practices throughout the world being significantly more invasive than in the U.S., and in other areas, significantly weaker.
It’s time for the U.S. and ICAO to get back on the same page. It’s too early to entirely lift the liquid ban, but based on the fact that this reduction seems to only affect liquids purchased at the airport (or an airport) reduces the risk that the liquids contain explosives, save for the ever present risk of a hole in the employee screening and vendor and catering screening processes, which could allow an insider to smuggle a liquid explosive through anyway. But we’re not talking about those layers of security – here.
Body imager fails to detect firearm
2011 February 22 by leadingedgestrategies
Is Twitter to be blamed for the failure of screeners to detect a gun, five times through a TSA checkpoint?
A TSA employee testing the Advanced Imaging Technology (i.e. body scanner) at DFW was able to smuggle a firearm through the AIT’s on five separate occasions without being detected.
Click here for NBC story.
It’s still too early to tell what went wrong. It has not been made public just what element of the system failed. Did the technology fail to present the image properly? Did the technology fail to identify the threat item and highlight it, or did the screener miss it? We don’t know but these are all valid questions that must be asked and answered.
Possibly, the TSA tester wanted to try a new method of concealment – a method that was not previously attempted during the initial testing the imager went through at the TSA’s System Integration Facility (TSIF), before being deployed. Again, another important question to answer.
One issue is that individuals who go through the body imager do not usually go through the metal detector, which would have likely been triggered by the gun. It’s ironical that the technology that is supposed to replace the old school metal detector failed to detect the very thing it’s predecessor was designed to detect.
It’s too early to say that technology failed us. And it’s too early to say that screener training failed us. What it’s not to early to say is that aviation security needs to remain a system of layers, that is not 100% reliant upon a single point of failure. The TSA tester should have been identified through behavior detection, travel document check, pre-screening or some other mechanism before getting to the checkpoint.
Unfortunately, as noted (oddly enough) in a book title Brain Rules for Baby, author John Medina notes that social networking is making the human race less capable of detecting the non-visual cues that have been our baseline survival tool for the past several thousand years. So maybe this was a human failure. Blame Twitter.
Pilot You Tube Videos Revealed. . . what?
2010 December 27 by leadingedgestrategies
This story is getting a lot of play this week. I’ve heard that this pilot has been called everything from a hero to a whistleblower, and his attorney is equally enjoying his own celebrity. Just recently his attorney offered to make his client available to consult with Congress on aviation security.
Time to offer some reality.
First, I don’t know who the pilot is. Second, taking away his gun and credentials to carry concealed and be a Federal Flight Deck Officer is beyond my call. Like ALL stories, there are probably details here that we’re not hearing about. I can say that off-hand, it appears that the pilot violated certain items that are either Sensitive Security Information, or through his methods of attempting to reveal security “gaps,” he has demonstrated to the authorities that he may not be able to be trusted with other SSI materials and data.
As for what he revealed and his hero status and potential to brief Congress. From what I can tell, a “gap” was not revealed. The fact that many airport and airline employees do not undergo screening like passengers do, is not an industry secret. It’s been going on since about the time that screening for passengers was implemented. It IS a controversial topic, but there are not easy solutions.
I addressed this issue in Practical Aviation Security. While many employees that work at the airport do go through screening, thousands still do not — at least not in the way that passengers do. In the U.S. employee “screening,” is conducted through the fingerprint-based criminal history record check. Yes, we decide to do a background check on employees, then we trust them. The same type of screening that many security experts have been calling for, in lieu of touching junk and being x-rayed.
That said, several significant aviation security attacks were conducted by employees so the problem clearly still exists. I don’t know that sending hundreds of thousands of employees through checkpoints will resolve that issue. It will certainly cost A LOT MORE MONEY and TSA would have to hire tens of thousands of employees to staff the new checkpoints. Or, TSA could decide that employee screening is the purview of the airport operator, and declare an unfunded mandate that airports install their own employee checkpoints and staff them with contract personnel. This is exactly what’s happening at Miami and Orlando, where employees are screened at checkpoints, in addition to the background check. However, these airports are paying for it themselves.
TSA has run pilot programs on various employee screening options and I agree that this is an area that remains weak in terms of the layered system. However, the “hero” pilot has not revealed anything new here. I know from reading plenty of congressional testimony in my book research that Congress is already aware of this fact. If you want a pilot to address Congress about aviation security issues, then I suggest you contact the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). ALPA has a great team with excellent security backgrounds and can put the proper perspective on this issue.
I’m sure the pilot who shot these videos (many of which just show the public areas of an airport), had good intentions. However, if you really want to make security safer, get involved with your trade associations and union security committees. I think you’ll find some folks there with a wealth of knowledge who can help you address your concerns, so at least you can keep your credentials and gun.
It’s finally gone too far
2010 November 4 by leadingedgestrategies
If you’re not aware of the ramifications of TSA’s new pat-down policy, click here. If the link is still active, what you likely saw was a TSA screener appearing to conduct a pat down search of a a small boy. Yea, I know it looks like he’s feeling him up, but according to our government this is a necessary process to protect the flying public.
Okay, it’s now officially gone too far. I of all people understand that kids, women, the developmentally disabled, and the elderly have all been used to smuggle bombs, carry bombs, or other criminal or terrorist purposes, but there is a much BETTER way to do this. There is a process we can use that with one look, would have told the screener that that particular kid is not a threat.
First, let’s look at the options for screening individuals, then you can determine (or weigh in if you disagree) as to what the best method(s) are.
Since the 1970s, passengers have passed through walk-thru metal detectors. We know they don’t detect explosives, so what are our other options? There are basically 6 options for screening people for explosives: (1) body imagers, (2) portal trace detectors, (3) behavior detection, (4) physical pat downs, (5) electronic screening of passenger information prior to boarding – i.e. TSA’s Secure Flight but at a much higher level, and (6) thorough background checks on passengers.
Keep in mind that privacy rights groups have issues with ALL of these methods. Sorry, can’t make everyone happy – my goal is to not have to give up a ton of rights either, but also to make sure I can safely board a plane with my family without having my kids molested in the process. And to be fair, I’m sure most TSA screeners don’t look forward to patting down the general public anymore than we want to be patted down. I’m not pointing the finger at them (unless you touch my kid!), I’m pointing at this policy that needs serious review.
Let’s back out items 5 and 6 right now. While they can be effective, pretty much only so as a layer, not a process that you’d bet your life on.
That leaves us with body imaging, portal trace (known as the Puffers), behavior detection and pat-down.
Body imagers come with privacy issues, they are slower than walk-thru metal detectors, but they are quicker than pat-down, less physically intrusive and the imagery is viewed remotely (I’m sure you can see yourself on YouTube later though — even though we’ve been told these machines do not store images, it’s now been shown that they do — but who cares, it’s not like anyone can identify you with that fuzzy image). They are effective at detecting most threat objects including explosives, guns and knives.
Portal trace detectors were rolled out after two Chechan suicide bombers brought down 2 Russian airliners in 2004. Keep in mind this wasn’t the first time a suicide airliner bombing had occurred, but it was the first time the government really took notice. The “puffers” as they were called were slow, had a high breakdown rate and you still had to go through the metal detector because they don’t detect metal, like guns and knives. The puffers were pulled out of airports due to their breakdown rate and to make room for the deployment of the body imagers.
Pat-down: the most intrusive, embarrassing process you can subject the individual too. Not only passengers, but airline and airport employees must go through this with even more frequency. It takes longer than any of the other processes and comes with all sorts of bad implications. I’m sure some child molester, after seeing the LA times photo, ran to find the nearest TSA application.
Behavior detection: non-intrusive, highly effective when done properly, takes the smallest amount of time of all of the processes. The problems here go back to the old “profiling” argument – that people are being selected based on race or nationality. This argument is as old as law enforcement itself. The other challenge here is a GAO report released earlier this year that showed that TSA’s BDO’s failed to spot potential terrorists that passed through U.S. airports. TSA points to the fact that many people have been arrested based on BDO detection, but for outstanding warrants, illegal immigrant status, or something other than terrorism.
The debate rages on as to whether this process is effective but I wholeheartedly believe in it. Here’s why: The Israeli’s relied on it so heavily that for a period of time they relied more on their security questioning/behavior process than physical screening equipment. The U.K. has adopted a similar model and is already reporting successes. This type of process is also what stopped an individual from blowing up an El Al flight departing Heathrow in 1986, whereas tons of stuff gets through technology based checkpoints every day.
So what are we doing wrong here and how can we implement something that works and keeps screeners from feeling us up at the checkpoints?
First, some reality with respect to the GAO report. Maybe the bad guys who came through U.S. airports didn’t encounter any BDO’s. With some 800,000 million passengers going through U.S. airports and only about 3,000 BDO’s it’s possible that they just missed each other. Or, maybe the bad guys had no ill intent that day they were at the airport, and thus exhibited no signs. Remember, it’s very difficult to measure something like deterrence — it’s difficult to know if a deterrent measure resulted in the bad guys saying “we don’t want to go that way because of . . .” Unfortunately, the bad guys don’t often call us and let us know when some measure we’ve implemented actually deterred them.
Second, we have to look at why these programs are successful everywhere else but here. The science of this is dubious and to being a researcher myself, I agree…to some extent. I think body language psychology is more art than science. Ever watch the TV poker tournaments? The entire process is based on two things, knowledge of statistics (playing the game well) and “reading” your opponent. When science is having problems proving things, I fall back to the old adage and ask, does it work anyway? If it works, then there must be something to it, and we just haven’t figured out the science behind it yet. However, there has been recent movements towards using technology to detect deception. Again, the old argument that we will be “saved” by technology, but just remember that the studies on the effectiveness of technology is often conducted by the companies interested in selling the technology.
Third, when I talk about the use of behavior detection, I’m not talking about the exclusive use of that strategy. Initial passenger screening should begin with the booking of the ticket — do a name check. If they’re a bad guy, arrest them, if they are a suspect, give them additional scrutiny when they get to the airport. At the airport, behavior detection should take over in the form of officers at the queue lines, talking to passengers. This process will have to be refined because there is a big gap between what a BDO suspects and what a cop can do about it. Plus, it seems the training can be better — let’s analyze what others are doing and see where we’ve potentially watered down the process here.
Then, individuals who either through their travel documentation or behavior that exhibit warning signs, should be given secondary screening, to include explosive trace detection, body imaging, or if they do not want to be “imaged” then private pat down screening.
Using this process effectively, we’ll start focusing on the bad guys and quit molesting kids at the checkpoint, in the “name” of security.
This has been a test of the aviation security system
2010 August 31 by leadingedgestrategies
Remember when the Emergency Broadcast System would do those tests on TV? They still do from time to time, but without the threat of being annihilated by Soviet ballistic missiles, we don’t seem then much anymore. However, terrorists and bad guys continue to conduct tests of aviation security, and they just did another one. Click here for details.
When two men were apprehended in Amsterdam after traveling from Birmingham, AL to Chicago and Dulles, were found to have several items such as cell phones, watches, liquid bottles and box cutters taped together in their checked luggage your first thought should be that they were testing the aviation security in preparation for a future attack. Whether they were testing for a future bombing or hijacking attempt or just to be stupid, it was still a test.
The fact that there were air marshals on the flight increases the likelihood that not only was this a test but that the U.S. government may have already known about these guys and were tracking their movements. While the FAM’s don’t release statistics on how many air marshals are out there, the numbers are too few for it to be a coincidence that they were on the same flight.
The items themselves are not prohibited in checked luggage. However, the manner in which they were found is suspicious. Additionally, not a lot of people toss their cell phones into their checked bag. Most passengers take their cell phones everywhere. If the TSA was aware of the individuals and ensured that air marshals were on the flight to monitor their behavior, then the system likely worked. It’s a process known as authorize-and-monitor (sometimes called “approve-and-monitor”), where suspected bad guys are allowed to continue about their business but are kept under surveillance. The process is used when someone hasn’t done something bad yet, and therefore can’t be arrested (yet), or when the good guys hope the bad guy will unknowingly provide them more information about a planned operation. For it to work, the bad guys can’t know they are being tracked.
The “underwear bomber” from last Christmas showed that terrorists are still interested in attacking aviation. Past history shows that terrorists rarely deviate too far from the playbook that has made them successful, unless those past avenues of attack are completely closed off. In other words, if bombing a flight worked before, the same methods will continue to be used until enough protections are put into place to deter that type of attack from working again. Liquids, box cutters, cell phones which can be used to trigger an improvised explosive device, are items that we are looking for. It makes sense that the bad guys will try to determine how effective we are at detecting them before trying an attack using such items.
What also makes this odd is the box cutters. Passengers cannot access checked bags during flight. It seems that these items were carefully constructed to attract the attention of screeners. If they would have gotten through, that’s valuable information for the bad guys. If they are caught, that is just as valuable information for the bad guys.
I have received various information about the bad guys testing our aviation security systems. I have heard that U.S. airport plans and maps have been found in terrorist hideouts Afghanistan. While I cannot confirm this myself, I consider my sources to be competent and accurate. Make no mistake — this was a test or dry run. Aviation will continue to be attacked — the 9/11 attacks will turn 9 years old soon and although we’ve made great strides, we have not turned terrorists away from aviation as a target. Let’s remember that while rail, bus and other forms of transportation must also be protected, aviation is how we move in this country. It’s our Achilles heel.
It will be interesting to see the facts of this case come out. In the Times Square bomber and the Christmas Day bomber the attackers own incompetence ensured a tragedy did not happen. It would be nice to see if the fact show that we actually caught these guys on a dry run or system test through our own competence.
Kids could be slaves; yea, it is a big deal
2010 August 15 by leadingedgestrategies
It seems that everyone has been quick to play down the journey of three underage travelers who decided on their own to fly from Florida to Tennessee (click here for article). Aviation experts, the airlines and TSA have all said that protocols were not violated. And, they are right — to a point.
However, the issue is not whether current protocols were violated, but whether we have the proper protocols in place. If we did, then this would have been a VERY big deal.
See, unfortunately, a hundred and forty years after slavery was ended in the U.S., it seems there is still a huge problem in the human slave trade. We addressed this in Practical Aviation Security and it is a frequent topic in Aviation Security International magazine. However, human trafficking rarely makes headlines here in the U.S., even though much of the human trafficking takes place here. One of the biggest signs of human trafficking is children traveling alone.
Now, children flying by themselves is not an unusual occurrence. In fact, I frequently flew as an “unaccompanied minor” to visit my grandparents during the summer months when I was growing up and escorted UM’s around the old Stapleton airport when I worked there. However, there are protocols in place for handling a “UM.” There is paperwork the parents must fill out, then they are escorted to the gate by their parents or guardian, where they are positively handed over to a specific adult flight attendant, who is responsible for ensuring the child or children arrive at their destination and to the right adults.
Human trafficking aside, there are also custody battle issues and child abduction issues that should be of concern here.
According to a recent article in Aviation Security International (click here) forced labor, child labor, prostitution and involuntary domestic servitude are all reasons for trafficking. While the U.S. has responded to terrorism and has trained some personnel in spotting “suspicious activity” there has been almost no training in spotting the signs of human trafficking, much of which is conducting through the commercial aviation system. Good aviation security means mitigating and preventing many types of threats, including terrorist attacks, bombings, theft, assaults and human trafficking.
In the United Kingdom, Operation Pentameter was launched to try to slow down and ultimately of course, to stop human trafficking. To date, the program has resulted in 188 women being rescued, including 12 minors between the ages of 14 and 17 and over 232 arrests. How old were those kids traveling by themselves? Between 11 and 15 years old.
There are suspicious indicators for children and adults that are traveling alone but are actually being trafficked, just as there are suspicious indicators for children traveling with their abductors. We need to add into our airport and TSA training behavior training programs these indicators. We need to train airline and airport personnel to watch for these signs — like an 11-year-old that strolls through the checkpoint and the airline gate by themselves, we need to once again decide that it’s not okay to allow slavery in our lifetimes and actually do something about it.
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