Leading Edge Strategies

Don’t hit the snooze on this alarm

2012 February 18 by leadingedgestrategies

Ideology Dies Hard, maybe we need Bruce Willis

2011 November 23 by leadingedgestrategies

Ever notice in all the Die Hard movies that once the bad guys are dead, they stay dead? They don’t continue to inspire hundreds if not thousands of others? Too bad movies don’t imitate real life.

For the past few years, YouTube has been the place for those really upset with society to get their terrorist freak on. Fortunately, the propaganda machine was hit with the heavy sledge hammer on the day that YouTube Star and Chief Motivational Officer (CMO?) for al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan had Hellfire missile for breakfast. But I guess there are a few previously inspired nutjobs still out there.

The recent arrest of Jose Pimentel, suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S. demonstrates the power of the spoken word and the threat posed by those who not only inspire violence, but provide information on how to carry out such attacks. This model is not without precedent – it is well known now that Timothy McVeigh was inspired by the Turner Diaries, to carry out his attack on Murrah Building. Now, being a writer, I’m the last one to dress down our 1st amendment right to free speech, but every writer should realize that what you write, sometimes has power and influence. I guess if you’re going to yell fire in a crowded theater, when there’s no fire, don’t be surprised when someone pops you one. Remember Salman Rushdie?

The power of the Lone Wolf nor the propaganda ministers, should not be ignored. While large scale attacks, such as the Mumbai active shooter assaults, the train bombings in Madrid and the subway and bus bombings in London, along with 9/11, are devastating, hundreds have been killed by a lone wolf. The downing of PSA Flight 1771 in 1987 was by a distraught airline employee as just one for instance. The bombings of numerous aircraft throughout aviation’s history were carried out by a single person.

The Lone Wolf attacks seem to be ramping up. It’s apparently getting harder for the bad guys to put together a large-scale attack, but consider if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called “underwear bomber,” or Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, had been successful. Hundreds would have perished, and the response from Congress and Homeland Security would have cost billions more to the U.S. economy and eroded more of our personal freedoms and way of life.

While we have been worried about the large scale attacks, we should not lose focus on the Lone Wolf. The Lone Wolf is harder to detect – he or she lives among us and moves throughout our society with less suspicion. Operational security is easier to maintain when the Lone Wolf keeps his mouth shut, as compared to 19 people, their handlers and trainers, and support personnel, trying to keep their mouths shut. The Lone Wolf, when properly motivated, carries out his or her mission, rather than, as in the case of one of the 9/11 hijackers, who began to lose heart because he had a wife and child to live for. The Lone Wolf is a one-and-done operation, which are among the hardest to defeat.

What will stop the Lone Wolf? The first step is to eliminate the motivators and opportunities for training. The killing of a Anwar al-Awlaki and the editor of Inspire magazine, Samir Khan, is a victory for the good guys. Both used the power of social media to influence the masses, just as Hitler and others controlled the media in order to ensure only approved messages were sent forth. Inspire magazine provided blueprints for creating bombs and carrying out attacks. While similar “instructional” documents are available on the Internet, consider that much of what is on the Internet, isn’t accurate enough to stake your life on. Just ask any academic or researcher.

Most of the Lone Wolf attacks that have been recently thwarted have been the result of good investigative and intelligence work. This layer of aviation security cannot be underestimated. While the focus is always on the screening checkpoint, the reality is that the checkpoint is near the FINAL point of failure of the system – it’s better to stop the attack in the initial phases.

Other Lone Wolf preventative measures include, as I’ve always encouraged, good workplace violence training and being aware of your surroundings and the people you come into contact with. Lone Wolves exhibit signs far ahead of time, that they are disenfranchised – not like everyone else in the U.S. workforce, but enough to take violent action. While we all may despise working for “the Man,” there are those who have decided that their lot in life is really someone else’s fault, and they find inspiration and instruction on YouTube and in the pages of terrorist publications.

While the recent deaths of bin Laden, al-Awlaki and their ilk, have struck a blow for justice, there always seems to be someone coming along to take their place. Their influence has extended beyond their years here among the living, and continue to inspire others. There will be others. There will always be others. It’s not time to let the guard down. Bruce Willis’ enemies may die hard, but ideology dies hardest.

You can’t go your own way

2011 October 18 by leadingedgestrategies

Let’s Make a Deal – behind door number one is a no-hassle trip to your airplane, with no guarantee it will be hijacked or bombed. You’ll be flying old school.

Behind door number 2 is a body imager, whereupon your saturated fat bursting self will be viewed in all its unglamorous glory by people you don’t know – there’s even chance your unsexy image will be on YouTube before you are able to get to your plane, have your laptop crushed by the seat back of the insensitive jerk in front of you and the flight attendant gives you your peanut ration. But, your flight probably won’t be hijacked or bombed, that is unless some guy working at the airport, who is able to bypass security, decides to join al Qaeda.

Behind door number 3 is someone you’ve never met asking you intimate details about your travel plans, your personal life, and whether or not you still beat your wife.

Regardless, if you want to fly, you’re not getting out of here without choosing a door

So you choose door number 1, and behind it is a goat. Door number 1 means you’re not flying.

What’s next? If you choose door #2 the electric privacy rights groups will protest that your image is being displayed for all to see. If you choose door #3, the ACLU will protest that your intimate travel plans are “nunya,” as in none ya business.

As the old man in the third installment of Indiana Jones said, “you must choose.”

In a recent USAToday article, the TSA revealed their first major attempt at risk based security. Click here for the article. Whereas passengers have complained about the body imaging devices, now some are complaining about the allegedly intrusive questions that the new TSA assessor program is testing at Boston/Logan. It’s as close a mirror as you can reasonably get to how the Israelis conduct their operation and it’s too early to tell if it’s going to work.

Frankly, if this is done right, it should work. Even special operations personnel and undercover officers will tell you, the last thing you want to do when you’re trying to hide, is talk to someone.

As an upgrade from the TSA’s passive observation program, assessor puts security personnel before the screening process to engage in casual conversation to try to determine if an individual has something to hide. The process itself is time tested (when done correctly). It stopped the bombing of an El Al flight in 1986 out of London/Heathrow; security questioning is still used in airports throughout the European Union, like at the Leonardo DaVinci International Airport in Rome, and was widely used internationally prior to 9/11.

I have an old video clip that shows people being interviewed back in the early 70s, when passenger and carry-on bag screening first started. Back in the day, a plane was just as likely to take a weather delay as it was to get hijacked. We decided we needed to screen passengers for the safety and security of the flight – we used existing technologies and processes at the time. Today, we have another imminent threat and the technologies of the 1970′s are no longer adequate. We need to use the new technologies and processes  - so do you want door number 2 or 3?

If you really object to being questioned about your travel plans, then decide to head for the body imager. Otherwise, if you don’t mind sharing a few travel details, you have the potential to maybe undergo some lesser screening (someday). Regardless, you’re not getting on the plane without one form of screening or another. And frankly, I want you screened if I’m on your flight.

I applaud TSA for putting their money where their mouth is and making an attempt at testing this process to see if a proven technique is really scalable to our aviation system and to see whether it works.

Al-Qaeda “tweets” a panic attack

2011 September 5 by leadingedgestrategies

What does a woman in Mexico tweeting about non-existent school shooting attacks and a government warning about a plot by al-Qaeda to use small, explosives filled aircraft to attack U.S. targets, have in common? They are both efforts to create fear and panic, and to cause us to spend more money to chase our tails.

Click here for story.

Industry reps tell me that the neither the FBI nor DHS have issued guidance or warnings about this latest threat and from the language of the L.A. Times article, it reads similar to previous threats from General Aviation that have been issued.

In the Mexico City incident, individuals falsely tweeted about schools being attacked by gunmen, sending many people into a panic that shut down emergency telephone lines. In the “GA Threats” article, al Qaeda may be trying to achieve the same panic effect. Just by sending out some information that a plan to use GA explosives-laden aircraft to attack U.S. targets is in the works, or even the final stages, while likely not to cause widespread panic, adds to the overall fear factor. It may just fuel a community fire or political fires to put more regulations and restrictions on the GA industry, which alone adds $100 billion in economic impact to the United States.

While regulating general aviation aircraft, or causing higher security requirements (and thus, more cash to be spent) on “securing” general aviation may seem to be a small inconvenience to those outside of the GA industry, it’s one more expense, it’s one more “fear” for us to worry about, it’s one more pinprick, that is slowly eroding our economy and our civil rights.

In 1776 a group of individuals signed a Declaration of Independence. That document proclaimed freedom from oppression. At the time, the oppression was from a specific source. The Declaration though did not come with an expiration date, nor was it specific to one entity doing the oppression. It was a declaration from all forms of oppression, including al Qaeda and any other group or individual that seeks to deny our God given right to choose our destiny.

Implants and Bombs

2011 July 7 by les-admin

Why you should not be afraid, or even very afraid

2011 May 6 by les-admin

I was at my usual Starbucks stop this morning and took my usual stroll through the connected Barnes & Noble to buy a magazine, when the clerk said she saw me on TV the other day, talking about the bin Laden raid. She was worried because she is going to be on a commercial flight soon and feared a counter-attack.

I asked her if she was flying domestically or international. Domestic.

I told her not to worry too much. First, there’s a slim chance statistically that she would be on a flight that has an issue, but second, because of the Navy SEAL party at bin Laden’s house last week, nothing big should be happening anytime soon. Let’s face it – al Qaeda is not stupid. The killing of their leader represents a colossal failure of intelligence on their part. Plus, the fact that the U.S. now possesses a lot of bin Laden’s planning materials will make the rest of al Qaeda sit back and get paranoid. Any major event they had in the works may already be compromised.

Al Qaeda will need to assess its own intel failures, its operational security, and try to figure out just how much we now know about their operations and their operatives.

Most terrorists don’t fear death, but they do fear giving their life up cheaply. They want the operation to work and they are willing to be patient. They will be looking at their safe houses, and their personnel in a whole new, and suspicious way. They won’t know who to trust or whether their own information is now being analyzed somewhere in Langley, Virginia.

International travel is a slightly different story. So is the lone gunman. Internationally, American’s will make easy targets for a low-level attack, such as a shooter, or hostage taking, or even a car bomb. These are easier hits because travel to the U.S. is not required for the bad guys. There is also the possibility that a lone gunman, living here in the U.S. either trained, recruited or just plain ticked off at life and has spent too much time on the Jihad websites, takes matters into his or her own hands and heads to a U.S. shopping mall with a weapon and an attitude. Hard to control that, but for the big ticket items, hijacking planes or sabotaging Amtrak, I think those are on hold for a little while.

Ding dong the Witch is dead

2011 May 2 by les-admin

Osama bin Laden is dead. However, despite some comments on certain media outlets, this does not end terrorism. In fact, if anything, we need to be more alert and aware than ever before. While bin Laden was the clear leader of al Qaeda, terrorism is not a new threat, and Islamic Jihad is a movement that will not stop because of a fallen leader.

Being a veteran of sorts of the drug wars of the late 80s and early 90s, I remember when Pablo Escobar was killed. While Escobar was a kingpin in drug trafficking, and his death was a victory for the good guys, others would take over his supply lines, routes and customers. Drug operations run like terrorist cells, characterized by small operations, consisting of individuals who operate largely independently. They come together, do an operation and then vanish. You can kill a cartel leader, but the trafficking goes on. Others will take their place, some more effective, some less. But it will go on.

What should we expect at this point? First, it would not surprise me to see some low level attacks, lone gunman type situations of followers of bin Laden who are now either leaderless, or let their emotions get the best of them and head to the streets with a gun or bomb. Second, there are plenty of other leaders within al Qaeda out there – particularly in the Yemen area. With bin Laden’s operations severely limited due to the entire world hunting for him, other cells of al Qaeda have ramped up their operations.

Also, remember that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of both the first bombing of the World Trade Center, and Operation Bojinka, a multi-level plot that included blowing up 12 U.S. airliners over the Pacific using liquid-based explosives, and the arrest of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Yousef’s uncle and the mastermind of 9/11, did not stop the al Qaeda engine. This is a 100 years war (probably longer) and the killing of bin Laden, while a necessary response, and a victory on our side, the threat is not going to go away. If anything, the threat will increase as some al Qaeda personnel will “go to ground” (lay low) and may start working more intelligently on either multiple small scale or large-scale attacks.

But for tonight, it’s okay to celebrate. This is a victory. I believe that to a certain extent tonight, maybe some of the victims of 9/11 have been vindicated.

Counterterrorism, Whack a Mole & the industry’s soft underbelly

2011 March 3 by leadingedgestrategies

A British Airways employee was just convicted of plotting to blow up an airplane (click here). He had  also been told by his handlers to find out if they could get a bomb or a person with a bomb on board a flight. Fortunately, Rajib Karim was only a computer tech – he had applied for but been rejected for a flight attendant’s position, which would have given him much easier access to the plane.

Just one day after Karim’s conviction, an airport worker with possible al Qaeda ties fired on a bus of American serviceman, killing two and wounding several others.

Unfortunately, this was all predictable, but the solution to the problem is far more complex.

Some will call for screening of employees, just like passengers go through. Employee screening has been a topic of debate in the aviation industry for over 20 years, but would this have solved the problem in either case, or will it prevent future such attacks?

When the Moscow bombing happened, there was talk of relocating the screening checkpoints farther out, into the terminal entry points. But, unless you spread those checkpoints out, like they do at Dallas/Ft. Worth, you have only relocated the site of the next attack – active shooters and bombers want to blow up areas where there are lots of people. Most U.S. airports are not configured like DFW so you’re talking about millions of dollars in terminal re-design if you go this way.

If you want to know where lots of people congregate in an airport, just ask Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, who today issued a statement saying that budget cuts will result in longer screening lines.

Since 1990, legislation has called for the “screening” of employees. Since 1990, the industry has defined “screening of employees” as some sort of background check. Some things have changed over time, and you will routinely see employees going through the security checkpoint, but the majority of employees at an airport legally bypass the screening areas every day. When you ask if employees are “screened,” the answer is yes – through the criminal history record check and the security threat assessment conducted on all airport and airline workers. But, most have not walked through a magnetometer before being allowed to access your plane.

It’s also not as simple as making everyone go through the existing passenger checkpoints. At some airports, you will put 10x the number of people through those checkpoints than currently go through, when you add employees to the mix.

To implement actual employee screening for all airport and airline workers runs into a gamut of challenges. First, is the infrastructure costs to redesign terminal areas to accommodate the screening equipment, then there is the additional cost of the screening equipment. Now factor in personnel costs to hire and train thousands of screeners. At the airports that do 100% actual employee screening, such as Miami and Orlando, there were opportunities during construction projects to do the necessary design changes. Their screener workforce are not TSA employees, they are private screening companies paid for by the airport operator through airport fees and revenue.

Some additional logistical challenges also arise when you decide to screen employees. What about aircraft mechanics that require tools that are on the prohibited items list? What about first responders, such as airport operations and maintenance personnel, paramedics, plus dozens of other airport and airline personnel who either must respond to an emergency, or must take quick action to avoid delays or other problems? One solution is to identify those individuals who are allowed to bypass the checkpoints, conduct higher levels of background checks and add biometric identification to airport access control systems.

BUT – what is to prevent the trusted employee from going bad, or from a bad guy becoming a trusted employee? This is not a new problem, just an old problem with a new set of consequences.

It’s well known that bad guys will put themselves into positions where it’s easier to commit their crimes. If you’re a burglar, you may try to find work as a locksmith, or contractor who has access to houses on a routine basis, or maybe even with an alarm system company. A standard mode of operation for a pedophile is to try to get a job where they have easy access to children, such as in schools or daycares. Just recently, a TSA behavior detection officer was arrested for drug smuggling (click here), and not too long ago two air marshals were arrested for drug and weapons smuggling. An airline worker was also recently arrested on charges of facilitating human trafficking.

Throughout the history of aviation some of the most significant attacks have been carried out by employees within the system, or assisted by employees. In some cases, attacks were carried out by individuals pretending to be employees. This is clearly the soft underbelly of aviation security.

What’s the solution when the trusted person, violates that trust, and the consequences are not smuggled drugs or weapons, but bombs on airplanes?

The solution is to follow the lead of those in the child care industry, but take it a step further. As a simple Sunday school teacher, I underwent a background check and was required to do training to know what was appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and to be able to spot inappropriate behaviors in others. I have to re-certify by going through the training every year. Does this process stop every single individual? No, but it stops a lot more than it used to by not doing training and background checks.

I agree that many airport and airline employees should be physically screened, but there are whole categories that should not. Trusted employees need to be (a) given a higher level of background check, beyond just fingerprints, wants and warrants, and (b) training on how to spot unusual and dangerous behavior – just like the workplace violence training programs.

Presently, the background checks required by the federal government are still not strong enough. They are far better than they were, but many local airports conduct higher levels of background checks because of the gaps in the federal process. Employees that are “trusted” such as airport police, operations and maintenance personnel, certain airline personnel, pilots and flight attendants, should undergo very thorough background checks, looking at past-history of associations and links to potential bad guys or bad organizations. I know this sounds a bit heavy but we’re allowing you unfettered access to the airport and aircraft in trade. If you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to worry about. If you don’t want that level of check, go through the checkpoint.

Additionally, all employees that receive an airport identification badge or airline ID badge should be trained in the basics of identifying workplace violence indicators, and suspicious activity. They should re-certify every year.

The good news is that since 9/11, we’ve caught a lot of bad guys and shut down a lot of operations. Perhaps terrorists aren’t as smart as they used to be because so many have been caught that al Qaeda is now recruiting a few notches down on the intellect ladder – notice how the last few terrorist attacks have resulted in guys not remembering their training in how to make a bomb go off? I think that it’s a mixture of luck, and the bad guys using dumber bad guys to try to pull off attacks, because a lot of smart guys either met their demise,went into hiding or are in custody.

Aviation security is just like Whack-a-Mole. Whenever one threat is mitigated, another one pops up. The threat of employees within the system committing terrorist and criminal acts is one that pops up frequently. We need to quit hitting the mole’s head and start working on extracting it completely, through better background checks and better training, or it will pop up again, with deadly consequences.

It’s finally gone too far

2010 November 4 by leadingedgestrategies

If you’re not aware of the ramifications of TSA’s new pat-down policy, click here. If the link is still active, what you likely saw was a TSA screener appearing to conduct a pat down search of a a small boy. Yea, I know it looks like he’s feeling him up, but according to our government this is a necessary process to protect the flying public.

Okay, it’s now officially gone too far. I of all people understand that kids, women, the developmentally disabled, and the elderly have all been used to smuggle bombs, carry bombs, or other criminal or terrorist purposes, but there is a much BETTER way to do this. There is a process we can use that with one look, would have told the screener that that particular kid is not a threat.

First, let’s look at the options for screening individuals, then you can determine (or weigh in if you disagree) as to what the best method(s) are.

Since the 1970s, passengers have passed through walk-thru metal detectors. We know they don’t detect explosives, so what are our other options? There are basically 6 options for screening people for explosives: (1) body imagers, (2) portal trace detectors, (3) behavior detection, (4) physical pat downs, (5) electronic screening of passenger information prior to boarding – i.e. TSA’s Secure Flight but at a much higher level, and (6) thorough background checks on passengers.

Keep in mind that privacy rights groups have issues with ALL of these methods. Sorry, can’t make everyone happy – my goal is to not have to give up a ton of rights either, but also to make sure I can safely board a plane with my family without having my kids molested in the process. And to be fair, I’m sure most TSA screeners don’t look forward to patting down the general public anymore than we want to be patted down. I’m not pointing the finger at them (unless you touch my kid!), I’m pointing at this policy that needs serious review.

Let’s back out items 5 and 6 right now. While they can be effective, pretty much only so as a layer, not a process that you’d bet your life on.

That leaves us with body imaging, portal trace (known as the Puffers), behavior detection and pat-down.

Body imagers come with privacy issues, they are slower than walk-thru metal detectors, but they are quicker than pat-down, less physically intrusive and the imagery is viewed remotely (I’m sure you can see yourself on YouTube later though — even though we’ve been told these machines do not store images, it’s now been shown that they do — but who cares, it’s not like anyone can identify you with that fuzzy image). They are effective at detecting most threat objects including explosives, guns and knives.

Portal trace detectors were rolled out after two Chechan suicide bombers brought down 2 Russian airliners in 2004. Keep in mind this wasn’t the first time a suicide airliner bombing had occurred, but it was the first time the government really took notice. The “puffers” as they were called were slow, had a high breakdown rate and you still had to go through the metal detector because they don’t detect metal, like guns and knives. The puffers were pulled out of airports due to their breakdown rate and to make room for the deployment of the body imagers.

Pat-down: the most intrusive, embarrassing process you can subject the individual too. Not only passengers, but airline and airport employees must go through this with even more frequency. It takes longer than any of the other processes and comes with all sorts of bad implications. I’m sure some child molester, after seeing the LA times photo, ran to find the nearest TSA application.

Behavior detection: non-intrusive, highly effective when done properly, takes the smallest amount of time of all of the processes. The problems here go back to the old “profiling” argument – that people are being selected based on race or nationality. This argument is as old as law enforcement itself. The other challenge here is a GAO report released earlier this year that showed that TSA’s BDO’s failed to spot potential terrorists that passed through U.S. airports. TSA points to the fact that many people have been arrested based on BDO detection, but for outstanding warrants, illegal immigrant status, or something other than terrorism.

The debate rages on as to whether this process is effective but I wholeheartedly believe in it. Here’s why: The Israeli’s relied on it so heavily that for a period of time they relied more on their security questioning/behavior process than physical screening equipment. The U.K. has adopted a similar model and is already reporting successes. This type of process is also what stopped an individual from blowing up an El Al flight departing Heathrow in 1986, whereas tons of stuff gets through technology based checkpoints every day.

So what are we doing wrong here and how can we implement something that works and keeps screeners from feeling us up at the checkpoints?

First, some reality with respect to the GAO report. Maybe the bad guys who came through U.S. airports didn’t encounter any BDO’s. With some 800,000 million passengers going through U.S. airports and only about 3,000 BDO’s it’s possible that they just missed each other. Or, maybe the bad guys had no ill intent that day they were at the airport, and thus exhibited no signs. Remember, it’s very difficult to measure something like deterrence — it’s difficult to know if a deterrent measure resulted in the bad guys saying “we don’t want to go that way because of . . .” Unfortunately, the bad guys don’t often call us and let us know when some measure we’ve implemented actually deterred them.

Second, we have to look at why these programs are successful everywhere else but here. The science of this is dubious and to being a researcher myself, I agree…to some extent. I think body language psychology is more art than science. Ever watch the TV poker tournaments? The entire process is based on two things, knowledge of statistics (playing the game well) and “reading” your opponent. When science is having problems proving things, I fall back to the old adage and ask, does it work anyway? If it works, then there must be something to it, and we just haven’t figured out the science behind it yet. However, there has been recent movements towards using technology to detect deception. Again, the old argument that we will be “saved” by technology, but just remember that the studies on the effectiveness of technology is often conducted by the companies interested in selling the technology.

Third, when I talk about the use of behavior detection, I’m not talking about the exclusive use of that strategy. Initial passenger screening should begin with the booking of the ticket — do a name check. If they’re a bad guy, arrest them, if they are a suspect, give them additional scrutiny when they get to the airport. At the airport, behavior detection should take over in the form of officers at the queue lines, talking to passengers. This process will have to be refined because there is a big gap between what a BDO suspects and what a cop can do about it. Plus, it seems the training can be better — let’s analyze what others are doing and see where we’ve potentially watered down the process here.

Then, individuals who either through their travel documentation or behavior that exhibit warning signs, should be given secondary screening, to include explosive trace detection, body imaging, or if they do not want to be “imaged” then private pat down screening.

Using this process effectively, we’ll start focusing on the bad guys and quit molesting kids at the checkpoint, in the “name” of security.

Securing Air Cargo; the air cargo bomb lottery

2010 November 1 by leadingedgestrategies

The recent attempt to either bring down aircraft using air cargo, or mail letter bombs via air cargo (we’re still not sure but I’ll go with the Brits on this and agree it was likely an attempt to bring down a plane) has shed light on a little known part of the aviation industry. This will inevitably put air cargo security on some legislative aids’ To Do List  somewhere, who will be directed to draft legislation to make sure that air cargo is “secured.” Before the Congressional staffers fire up their laptops, let’s look at what we’re really trying to secure here, because I can tell you that someone will soon call for the screening of all cargo that is shipped on all aircraft to be screened just like we screen luggage. That is NOT the solution.

Here’s why that won’t work:

The first thing to understand about air cargo is that cargo doesn’t move like people do. The supply chain is quite a bit different as we saw recently with two packages traveling on several different aircraft, including both passenger and all-cargo aircraft. Cargo is also shipped on vessels, rail and vehicles. In fact, one parcel can transition between several different conveyances (i.e. vehicle and air) and several different variants of a single conveyance. i.e. passenger vs cargo aircraft, or even small to large aircraft and back to small. This makes screening cargo the same way we screen passengers and their checked baggage very difficult.

Screening cargo itself is difficult because virtually EVERYTHING is allowed to be shipped in cargo, whereas there is a specific list of prohibited items for passenger and luggage. How will screeners be taught to distinguish between computer parts and electronics and a bomb? Can that even be done? In the printer-cartridge bomb, Qatar authorities said that the way the bomb was constructed x-ray nor dog detection would have found it. By the way, I disagree with the dog detection comment — dogs have detected drugs and explosives concealed in piles of human excrement, within food, within packages completely sealed in plastic. . . don’t believe me, hit the Mythbusters website. Also, I’ve written quite a bit about the abilities of the K-9 teams, starting in 1995 and would trust my life with their noses.

Anyway, the point is that cargo looks different and can be about anything. It can appear as a pallet of automobile parts, or computer parts, or medical components that has been sealed to prevent tampering. It can be fresh flowers coming up from South America. It can be hazardous material (yes, it also goes on commercial aircraft — more regulated after the 1996 crash of ValuJet), it can be human organs, it can be just-in-time delivery of inventory for a retail outlet. The Airforwarders association puts the price tag of trying to install systems to physically screen all of this at just under $1 billion dollars, and that’s just for the first year.

Next, think of the infrastructure that airports would have to put into place at airports to conduct this screening. Just like screening checkpoints changed after 9/11, you would have to find a place to do the screening at the airport (think about massively expanding the air cargo areas), and also you had better start building a lot more roads into the airport to handle the traffic jam of tractor-trailer rigs that are going to be waiting in line for their goods to be offloaded and screened. Not very “green” folks.

It’s at this point, that just-in-time delivery gets shut down. There is a real economic price when that happens as much of our industry today is built upon the just-in-time model. Wal-Mart and similar retail stores will have to start warehousing more goods, which costs money, which will either come from laying off employees, closing stores or raising prices on the consumer, or most likely, all three plus a few that I haven’t thought of.

Consider also the small general aviation airports where much of the cargo passes into and out of communities. There will have to be massive changes there as well to install screening systems. Many of these airports don’t have the financial ability to handle this.

And even if we do all of this in the U.S., that doesn’t mean that the International community will follow suit.

Traditionally, the industry (domestic and international) has used a trusted shipper program for cargo security. In the U.S. this is called Known Shipper. ICAO calls it “Registered Agent.” It means that the shipper of the product and the carrying company (the airline or company that actually is responsible for moving the package) have a course of business with each other, the shipper has been vetted and there is a mutual trust that they aren’t going to try to blow up the plane, or put anything they are not supposed to in the package, including undeclared hazmat.

After 9/11, the TSA took over the vetting of the Known Shipper from the airlines. The next step for TSA is what I think is a better way to secure air cargo. TSA calls it the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). Under CCSP, the shipper of the product, i.e. the company that accepts the product from the customer, must ensure it is properly screened. The TSA approves each CCSP shipper to ensure that each item accepted for shipment is screened by an x-ray, physical inspection (open it up and look at it), or explosive trace detection or other approved procedure or technology. TSA hired thousands of cargo inspectors just for this purpose. It’s the only practical way of screening cargo, unless you want to shut down the air cargo industry.

There is another way to look at this. In this case, it was not a security program that prevented the destruction of aircraft by cargo bomb, it was good intel gathering and prosecution. There is something to be said for allowing the intelligence agencies the responsibility for assuming some of this workload. I’m not suggesting that we don’t do any form of inspection of packages, but I am suggesting that we continue to focus on good intel work and field sources as an added layer of security.

Finally, there is another “safety valve” to air cargo security, and that’s the supply chain itself. It’s very difficult for someone who is shipping a package to know when and where that package is at any given time. Granted, you can go online and using the tracking number it will often tell you whether a package is in transit, or in the neighborhood, but hopefully it’s not giving you a GPS location of exactly where it is at every point in time. If you’re going to place a bomb into the cargo system, you could use a barometric trigger, but then you’re not certain if the package will be at altitude to go off in an all-cargo plane, a passenger plane, or even in a truck that happens to drive over a 12,000 mountain peak en route to a transition point. A timed switch takes just as much risk as you’re never sure when the explosive will detonate. It’s the terrorist version of playing the lottery – the air cargo bomb lottery.

Maybe they just bought a losing ticket this time and will realize that this type of attack has a low probability of success. After all, in the history of air terrorism very few successful bombings have been attributed to a bomb placed in air cargo (see my book for the one successful one). I understand that everyone says that terrorists will try new forms of attack and I agree. Maybe this figured out that it’s hard to win the lottery, and with this attempt, they really showed some of their cards for our intelligence agencies to view (i.e. the bomb maker, a modus operandi, etc).