Leading Edge Strategies

The Real Problem with TSA (and the industry)

2010 January 12 by leadingedgestrategies

I say this knowing full well that I am an educator, a trainer in the aviation security industry, and the co-author of a textbook on aviation security, but the real problem with TSA (and many others in control of aviation security), is the lack of individuals that are formally trained in aviation security and who are unfamiliar with the aviation industry.

Myself and my industry counterparts have seen it for years. In fact, ever since TSA was formed, the problem has remained the same. TSA was started with tons of people who, while good intentioned, did not possess experience in aviation nor in aviation security. Many airport operators also put people in charge of aviation security who may have had good law enforcement or military backgrounds but did not understand aviation.

Now, before everyone goes all nuts, I KNOW that there is value to outside perspectives. I’m also a consultant and part of my business is to bring outside perspectives. But, perspective is less meaningful when you don’t even have a basic understanding of the system you are giving your perspective on. Let me also give TSA and many police officers and others throughout the industry credit for, over the years, continuing to try to educate themselves. TSA has also been hiring more people with aviation industry experience.

The sad fact remains (and the real problem is), that 9 years after 9/11 there are only a handful of university aviation programs in the country that offer a dedicated course in aviation security, and even less that offer a full degree program in aviation security.

For years however, there has not been a valid text that could provide instructors and colleges with the information necessary to build a class around. My intent with writing the text came from my own frustration that there wasn’t a good textbook out there I could use. Now that there is a good text, along with several other aviation security books that are now available for use in graduate programs and as additional research materials (they are all a part of my library and are excellent), and now that aviation security is back in the forefront I hope that more universities and colleges will start programs in aviation security.

As I travel throughout the industry I still see and hear the horror stories of airline and airport security coordinators who keep running into TSA personnel and others who are in charge at airports who do not have a basic grasp of the aviation industry. They need to understand that security has an impact on the system and by devaluing the system by eroding the benefits of aviation, does the very thing that the bad guys hope we do.

I believe that TSA and airports and airlines could also learn a lot from our international counterparts. The Europeans have been doing aviation security for a long time and have been hit with a variety of attacks. Also, while the majority of flights in the U.S. are domestic, the majority of flights in the EU and many other countries are “international.” That means the security of the flights must also take border protection into account, which increases the complexity of the task.

I’ve studied international security practices for many years and am an avid reader and contributor to Aviation Security International magazine, which looks at the worldwide security perspectives. We did not invent aviation security in this country and there is so much we can learn. Unfortunately, the Christmas day bombing attempt has likely made people less willing to listen to the international community, but that’s a mistake. We should remember that this guy was on a U.S. flight and should not have been.

For years, the FAA controlled aviation security and while those of us on the airport and airline side had our frustrations with them, most of them came from industry and had an understanding of how the system works. I’m happy to see that many of the FAA security personnel have finally made their way into TSA. I’d also be happy to see TSA continue their own education into aviation and aviation security. I enjoy seeing TSA personnel in my airport security classes as it gives me a chance to see their perspectives and for them to see ours.

Ultimately, of course, I want to see more and more aviation security classes and programs so that we can train the next generation of aviation security professionals, rather than having them show up after the next attack.

PanIC-demic

2009 May 14 by leadingedgestrategies

Okay, the PANIC-demic is over it seems. Although the actual human impact turned out to be relatively minor in nature, the Swine Flu did serve a purpose. It likely was a precursor to much more serious issues that may be coming our way. Hopefully, it provided your airport an opportunity to dust off any pandemic flu plans laying around, or get one drafted.

Swine Flu at an airport – confirmed

2009 April 30 by leadingedgestrategies

Authorities have confirmed that the swine flu has been diagnosed in a Colorado man who works as a baggage handler at Denver International Airport. Click here for the story. Also, the FAA has issued a Safety Alert for Operators. There is a checklist of actions you can compare your airport’s response plans to at the PandemicFlu.gov website. There is also guidance for flight crews on handling suspected cases of Swine Flu in-flight. Click here.

Swine Flu

2009 April 29 by leadingedgestrategies

It’s here folks – the swine flu. The Centers for Disease Control have issued a level 4 pandemic alert (the World Health Organization has it at 5), which means that there is an increased risk of swine flu but does NOT mean it will necessarily get to the pandemic level. A level 6 CDC alert is the pandemic level. The CDC has activated it’s emergency operations center and may soon issue a travel alert recommending U.S. citizens put off travel to Mexico. Customs and Border Protection agents are now passively looking for signs of influenza, but have no plans to conduct health screening of inbound passengers at this time.

We’ve been talking about this issue for awhile in the context of the pandemic flu and while we’re not there yet this could be a good test run of some of the plans airports, airlines and the government have been making. And if you don’t have a plan yet, now is a good time to start working on one.

The CDC is issuing travel advisories and TSA is asking airports to post warning signs.

From an aviation safety and security perspective, there are some things you should be thinking about. Absenteeism, personal protection, shift coverage and concerns with passengers, identifying individuals who may have symptoms and false symptom patients seeking medical attention, among others.

1. Ensure you have plenty of surgical masks and gloves, both for your staff and if possible for general distribution.

2. Ensure you can contact your local health and medical centers should a passenger arrive that is symptomatic.

3. Know where your quarantine areas are located and that your staff knows how to handle a quarantined individual.

4. You may see a higher rate of absenteeism as employees stay home to avoid public contact, to take care of sick family members or to take care of healthy kids who have been sent home due to school closures. They may also become sick with the flu or flu-like symptoms. Start working on staff-reduction contingencies now. 

Download the Federal plan for handling the pandemic flu here.

Security Theater? To be or not to be?

2009 February 28 by leadingedgestrategies

I’ve heard the term “security theater” used several times to describe the aviation security system. I’m not completely sure where or who started the term, but it’s worthy of addressing because it seems to get used by various experts and non-experts whenever the media needs a quick sound bite. But, let’s take a hard look at this term as related to aviation security.

To loosely define the term, security theater is used to imply that we do not have any real security in aviation, and that everything we do is smoke and mirrors. It’s done to give out the perception to the public that we’re doing something but we’re really not doing anything to reduce risk.

First, I disagree that ALL of the layers of the security system are pure “security theater.” We have done a lot to protect the system and while there are still gaping-holes in certain areas, we have made the pathways more difficult to traverse for those that want to do harm. Second, I agree that there ARE layers of the security system that are security theater, but that this may not be a bad thing all the time.

Author and security expert Gavin DeBecker discussed two kinds of security measures in his 2002 book, Fear Less: Real Truth About Risk, Safety, and Security in a Time of Terrorism. The first type makes the public feel safer, like deploying the National Guard to airports after 9/11. The second type actually reduces risk and in some cases, makes the public feel safer, like screening all checked baggage. While the preference is to implement “type-two” security measures, there is value to the first type. Measures used to give the perception that a pathway is closed, without actually closing it, has their place.

Using the analogy of protecting your house to make the point, think about when you go on vacation. If you’re following just basic security protocols, you’ll put some timers on lights in your house, leave the porch light on, have neighbors take in your paper and mail and if you’re in the snow belt, shovel your driveway if it snows. All of these methods do not really protect your house from a burglar if one decides to break-in, but are designed to give the appearance that someone is home. These type-one measures don’t necessarily reduce much risk but do make you feel a little better and give the appearance of security. Hopefully, it’s enough of an appearance that the bad guy will go somewhere else.

If you wanted to reduce risk, DeBecker’s second type of security, you would install an alarm, order extra police patrols, leave the dog in the house (with a dog door for necessities), lock the windows and doors, and maybe even have someone house sit. These type 2 measures reduce the chances you will get robbed, and make you feel safer. Of course, you could just stay at home, sitting with your gun in the middle of the living room, but then you wouldn’t get the vacation and there is still a chance a committed burglar could break in. Extending this metaphor, remember that we still need to fly and there are security risks when we do that. If you want to eliminate all security risks from flying, then stop flying.

Immediately after 9/11 we saw some security theater when members of the National Guard were deployed to the nation’s airports. Their presence likely did nothing to prevent a hijacking or a bombing and its questionable whether they were even a real deterrence to what they could have been used for, protecting the airport terminal from attack, but their presence did give the traveling public a sense of confidence and helped get them flying again.

The advantage of security theater is that is costs less, keeps the public flying and creates a sense of normacly. Remember, the real goal of terrorism is not primarily to destroy lives and property but to destroy the economy and stability of a nation. It’s important that we keep flying and not let our fears cause us to overreact. Obviously, we need to do those REAL security measures that reduce risk and provide actual layers (i.e. locking doors, alarm systems – to continue our analogy), so I’m NOT advocating that the theatrics is all we should do, but they are a part of an overall strategy.

Obama Adminstration looks at TSA

2009 February 19 by leadingedgestrategies

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (Feb 17, 2009) pointed out that the Obama Administration is considering changes to airport security procedures. The usual suspects weighed in with their opinions and I’m sure there is no lack of opinions amongst the general public about what should and should not be done with aviation security.

I think for a intelligent discussion on such issues, we have to minimize the opinons of the publicity seekers and get down to who the real experts are (some of whom were quoted in the WSJ piece) and what processes should and should not be done. I think another logical step is to look at the successful programs that are being done overseas but that we have not yet adopted.

Frankly, the changes that should take place in aviation security would likely fill up another book on the subject. But, let’s grab some low hanging fruit for now and see where it takes us.

Registered Traveler
The Registered Traveler (RT) program was cited in the article as one area that needs to be looked at. Initially, the program was called Trusted Traveler and its intent was to allow travelers to volunteer to be subjected to higher levels of scrutiny, in the form of biometrics and background checks. These travelers would then receive less screening at the checkpoint and thus allow travelers who we know very little about, to be the focus of the full screening programs.

Initially, the program was to also be a test bed for new technologies, and allow benefits to the trusted travelers, such as not having to remove shoes and the ability to keep their laptops in their briefcases (a common practice overseas by the way).

However, the TSA quickly decided that “trusted” put out the wrong image and that there should be no process whereby passengers receive less screening. Thus, RT was born. RT applicants still underwent the background check, paid fees, were issued biometric identification cards. They still must  have their identies verified biometrically when they fly, and the only benefit is that they go to the front of the screening line. That said, there are still plenty of business travelers that signed up for the program (including myself) because there is a cost benefit to not standing in the screening line.

The argument against less screening for RT’s is that there is always the risk that a person who is already in the RT program goes “rogue,” or slides by the background check. However, the RT program in it’s original design still allowed for random screening of RT passengers at higher levels and more thorough background checks – exceeding those of airport and airline employees. The RT concept we’re talking about here is one of reducing risk by focussing the most resources on the people we know the least about. When you try to defend against everything, you defend nothing.

Let’s also give TSA credit where it’s due. I disagree with those who think that the system is not any better than it was pre 9/11. With the new screening technologies that can better detect explosives, multi-view x-ray equipment, body imaging systems and behavior recognition programs, we are much more alert and prepared to identify threats than ever before. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 did not just address the last attack, like previous legislation had done, but addressed future threats. In some cases, as with the Large Aircraft Security Program, this has gone overboard, but in others, such as with cargo screening, TSA and the industry has been proactive.

Air Marshals
I do not agree that we should reduce the number of air marshals. This is what has happened historically with dire consequences. Read chapter 2 of Practical Aviation Security and you’ll see this disturbing pattern. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy ordered U.S. marshals to the skies after the first hijacking of a U.S. aircraft. After we implemented screening procedures in the early 70s the air marshals were scaled back, until a rash of hijackings in the Middle East in the mid 80′s brought the program back to life. Then, with fewer hijackings, the air marshals were rolled back again until we had about 33 still on the payroll on 9/11. It’s been less then a decade since 9/11 and people are already calling for a reduction in air marshals. I believe that the TSA has made some strides with the program by deploying them into other venues and putting them on assignments in the airport from time-to-time. And, I believe they are an essential part of any anti-hijacking program. Having flown to Israel on El Al, and undergone their numerous levels of screening, they still have air marshals on their planes. Maybe we should take a lesson from the people that have the least penetrable aviation system in the world.

More to come…