Body Imager Mythbuster?
2012 April 3 by les-admin
With millions of hits a controversial video has been circulating the Internet in which an individual claims to be able to defeat the TSA body imagers. TSA’s response has been unsurprising in that they have not provided any real rebuttal to the man’s claims. But that is to be expected. To provide rebuttal, specific to this man’s claims, provides information to individuals who want to defeat the technology for criminal or terrorist purposes.
I know the video has been out for a few weeks and I have withheld comment so far. The problem is we have a claim on the Internet from somebody that I have never met, who claims to have defeated a body imager under conditions that no one but him really was aware of and he doesn’t have the advantage to see what actually was displayed on the screen. Additionally, we do not know what the TSA screener may have seen in the monitor and, whether automatic threat recognition was in use or maybe the TSA screener identified an innocuous item and decided to give the gentleman pass. Or maybe they did truly miss it. The fact is we just don’t know.
I have been to the Transportation Security Integration Facility in Washington DC and seen the rigorous testing that these technologies undergo. This is not to say that an individual, or even a piece of equipment, can fail. We know from routine tests of the system that people and equipment both fail from time to time. There is no such thing as a perfect system or, despite what presidential candidates want us to believe, a perfect person.
I would like to correct one point the gentleman made in his viral video. He believes that we should go back to the age of metal detectors. He claims that body imagers do not detect the metallic objects that metal detectors detect and further claims that nobody has tried to destroy an airplane by wearing a bomb. Both of these statements are untrue. To cite just one of many incidents in our history, in August of 2004, two female Chechen suicide bombers, concealing explosives in their brassieres, took down 2 Russian airliners. It was this incident that in fact started the use of the patdown technique, the trace detectors and the body imagers.
Is that you, John Wayne, is this me?
2012 January 25 by les-admin
No Golden Rule for the TSA
2011 July 19 by les-admin
There is a lot of entertainment recently with the controversy over the Longmont, Colorado woman who allegedly groped a TSA screener. While this is a turnabout from what usually occurs, it’s not likely to change TSA’s procedures.
Implants and Bombs
2011 July 7 by les-admin
The latest threat to aviation security now appears to be bombs that are implanted or inserted inside the bomber. Whose to say the next buxom blonde at the checkpoint, isn’t packing bosoms that go boom? Well, let’s look at a few key points. Click here for the story.
Concealing items inside the body is not a new concept. Ask any customs agent or prison guard and either can explain the many ways the human body can be used as a hiding place for contraband. But as an explosive? Well, there was the incident in Saudi Arabia in August 2009, where a suicide bomber infiltrated security and detonated a bomb inserted in his rectum near a Saudi prince. The prince escaped with minor injuries. So, the concept is possible.
TSA has issued travel alerts that we can expect more scrutiny at checkpoints as a result of this threat, even though there is no specific threat (that they are telling us about) at the present. One perspective we do have to look at then, is the possibility that this is no more than al Qaeda propaganda sent our way intentionally to get us to overreact. Remember the printer cartridge plot out of Yemen? That cost al Qaeda about $4,000, meanwhile, we’ve spent billions trying to prevent that type of attack from happening. Not a bad return on your investment when part of your goal is to destabilize the U.S. economy (like we need help doing that – do these guys get C-Span?).
Is this just rumor, designed to get us to panic, be afraid and spend more money? There is also the question about whether the explosive, concealed inside implants, or the body, could be large enough to destroy an aircraft. Some experts feel it’s not possible, others disagree. I guess we need Mythbusters to help us out here.
But let’s assume that it is possible and that enough explosives could be concealed to bring down a plane. Will existing technology, i.e. body imagers, protect us? Yes, in some cases, body imagers can detect items inside an individual – it just depends on the machine. The body imagers come from our prison industry where they were designed to detect items concealed in the body. Also, explosive trace detection systems can be effective at determining if an individual has been handling or exposed to dangerous explosives. While it’s possible, it’s also very difficult to completely clean yourself of residue once handled. K-9 teams, in certain cases, can also detect explosives hidden within or residue left on the body.
There is another consideration. How will the device be detonated if it’s implanted? Will the detonating charge and mechanisms also be implanted? Sounds like some major surgery to me. We have to look at some basic facts. Terrorists and bad guys, who want to be successful, try to keep is simple. The more complex the attack, the more people get involved, the easier it is for things to break down and for someone to talk. There were several additional elements of the 9/11 plot that were left on the drawing table because the chance for failure was increasing with the complexity. Cargo planes were supposed to be targeted on 9/11 and at one point, Atta was pitched the idea of crashing into a nuclear facility instead of the World Trade Centers. Additional aircraft were also rumored to be hijacked on that day.
But back to the subject at hand.
I’m not as worried about implants as much as I would be concerned about a plot similar to the Saudi attack. Much easier to get someone to conceal an item in their rectum (although incredibly uncomfortable I would imagine) and attach a detonator, than to go through a highly complicated process of implanting a device.
But this leaves us with our fundamental security question: how safe do you want to be? If we start digging around in your body, are you ready to set aside your Fourth Amendment right not to be subjected to unreasonable search? Many people are – these are the “security at any costs” types who buy into the illusion that the government can prevent every bad thing from happening to them. Even after the pat-down of a 6-year-old and the diaper-gate nanny incident recently, there are still those that believe that everyone is a suspect and that no one should be exempt from scrutiny.
As General Robert E. Lee is credited with saying: “You cannot defend everything and by doing so, you will end up defending nothing.”
Maybe we need to look at this from a different perspective. Rather than buying billions in more technology to try to prevent this “next threat,” we invest heavily in our investigate and intelligence methods and personnel and attempt to stop the implant-plot before it gets out of the safe house, rather than at the last point of failure, the screening checkpoint.
Subject: Secure at Any Cost?
2011 June 28 by les-admin
I’m sure everyone has now heard about the TSA requiring a 95-year-old woman to remove her diaper as part of a pat-down at a screening checkpoint. Frequent readers of this blog may expect me to talk about profiling or the use of K-9′s instead of this embarrassing screening process however, I’m going to take a different approach.
In 1955, the first bombing of a U.S. commercial airliner took place. It happened in Denver, Colorado and was committed by Jack Graham, who put dynamite into his mother’s suitcase, took out an insurance policy on her and put her on the flight. All 44 were killed in the explosion. We assume mom did not know about the dynamite.
So, is it beyond the pale to think that there are people out there, who would, perhaps posing as a caregiver, pack a diaper full of explosives and dupe an Alzheimer’s patient or elderly person with Dementia and send them onto an airplane? No. In fact, probably been thought of already.
TSA is defending their actions by saying that all protocols and procedures were followed. I don’t deny that. But, the real question is, are the procedures correct? Are they the right thing to do? How much of our civil liberties and our freedoms are we willing to give up for a greater illusion of security? Ask yourself – would you want your grandmother or yourself to be subjected to this level of screening for a higher guarantee that the flight will not be bombed or hijacked? How about we strip everyone down, but it turns out that the pilot was an al-Qaeda sleeper agent, in place for ten years, who, without a weapon, except for his hands, breaks the first officer’s neck and crashes the plane into a building?
Well, at least grandma didn’t blow up the flight.
TSA is not the problem here, nor are they the solution. This is a Congressional issue. More likely, it’s a societal issue. When the trains and buses were bombed in London in 2005, the U.K. didn’t hire 60,000 screeners and install billions of dollars worth of screening equipment. Keep in mind that subways, trains and busses are the primary forms of transportation in the U.K., just as aviation is the primary form of transportation in the U.S. What the U.K. did was ramp up their MI5 (internal security service – think FBi) and MI6 (external security – think James Bond) to try to make sure similar attacks did not occur in the future.
Of course, I thought they overdid it on the liquid bomb plot but there’s a lot of backstory there – read Garrett Graff’s The Threat Matrix for more information on that plot.
The point is that in the U.K., they accepted a level of risk in order to not bankrupt the economy and to preserve their freedoms. We seem to do the opposite. More and more, going through a screening checkpoint resembles the process for a visitor to enter a prison.
You’ve heard me say it before. Life is a risk sport. Maybe we, as a society, decide that we need to improve our intelligence and investigatory capabilities, establish a baseline level of reasonable airline screening measures, toss in a few random measures now and then, do R&D and test new technologies and processes (slowly, let’s make sure the stuff works before we deploy it) and understand that every flight, just like every car trip to the airport, comes with a certain level of risk.
We do this already, we just don’t realize it. If every flight was to be made as safe as possible (and we’ll assume that we’ll still fly the plane and not just drive), everyone would be sitting backwards, we would all have parachutes with back ups, there would be double the flight crew, quadruple redundant computer and flight systems, a parachute for the plane, big floats in case it lands in the water (or Captain Chesley flights every flight), airbags in every seat back, twice the number of mechanics checking over the plane before it flies, twice the flight attendant compliment and at least one surgical team on board, and we’ll build the entire plane out of the same stuff that the black box (which always seems to survive) is built out of. The ticket will cost $20,000 one-way. Please take your seat.
I recently took Amtrak from Penn Station to Boston, where I got to observe rail security practices. With frequent announcements of “see something, say something,” videos showing up how to see something and say something, no lack of K-9 patrols and armed and armored (kevlar) police officers actively patrolling through the terminal and TSA personnel conducting random screening, I felt pretty safe getting on the train. Well, it is Amtrak, so let me clarify, I felt reasonably “secure” – I won’t get into Amtrak’s safety record.
Could a bad guy still get through the rail security? Sure. But, most bad guys during their surveillance are going to look at another target. Maybe another rail station besides Penn, where Port Authority and TSA seemed to really be on their game.
Maybe we, in aviation, take some lessons from the rail industry here?
That said, the problem I’m addressing is society based. Too many of us want a risk-free life and we want our government to guarantee and provide that to us. Even many people ARE willing to take their clothes off at the screening checkpoint – okay, some if those people are just perverts, but I’m talking about the certainty-freaks who think that if everyone does everything right, they personally will live to a ripe old age.
Like I said, we’re talking about Congressional perspective changes at the least, and ultimately, societal changes. Later, I’ll solve global warming, illegal immigration and world peace. For now, let’s look at what COULD have been done in Diaper-Gate.
Throughout the U.S., in fact, more often than many of us believe, there are breaches at airports. People somehow slip through the screening process, or go the wrong way down an exit lane into the Sterile Area, go out a fire alarm door into the airfield, or are accidentally allowed to enter the Sterile Area (where the gates are) with unresolved screening alarms. Sometimes TSA and the airport figures this out but can’t find the person. CCTV footage will be analyzed, cell phone calls will be made to the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), and airport and TSA security officials will confer. At some point, either the airport concourses are evacuated, or a decision is made that the risk is acceptable and normal operations resume without disruption to the system.
Not having all the facts in this case yet. Perhaps the traveling companions could have been interviewed (which they hopefully were), and a decision made, based on all the evidence, that letting grandma fly without taking off her diaper, is an acceptable risk.
Dignity, sanity and security is maintained.
Why you should not be afraid, or even very afraid
2011 May 6 by les-admin
I was at my usual Starbucks stop this morning and took my usual stroll through the connected Barnes & Noble to buy a magazine, when the clerk said she saw me on TV the other day, talking about the bin Laden raid. She was worried because she is going to be on a commercial flight soon and feared a counter-attack.
I asked her if she was flying domestically or international. Domestic.
I told her not to worry too much. First, there’s a slim chance statistically that she would be on a flight that has an issue, but second, because of the Navy SEAL party at bin Laden’s house last week, nothing big should be happening anytime soon. Let’s face it – al Qaeda is not stupid. The killing of their leader represents a colossal failure of intelligence on their part. Plus, the fact that the U.S. now possesses a lot of bin Laden’s planning materials will make the rest of al Qaeda sit back and get paranoid. Any major event they had in the works may already be compromised.
Al Qaeda will need to assess its own intel failures, its operational security, and try to figure out just how much we now know about their operations and their operatives.
Most terrorists don’t fear death, but they do fear giving their life up cheaply. They want the operation to work and they are willing to be patient. They will be looking at their safe houses, and their personnel in a whole new, and suspicious way. They won’t know who to trust or whether their own information is now being analyzed somewhere in Langley, Virginia.
International travel is a slightly different story. So is the lone gunman. Internationally, American’s will make easy targets for a low-level attack, such as a shooter, or hostage taking, or even a car bomb. These are easier hits because travel to the U.S. is not required for the bad guys. There is also the possibility that a lone gunman, living here in the U.S. either trained, recruited or just plain ticked off at life and has spent too much time on the Jihad websites, takes matters into his or her own hands and heads to a U.S. shopping mall with a weapon and an attitude. Hard to control that, but for the big ticket items, hijacking planes or sabotaging Amtrak, I think those are on hold for a little while.
Ding dong the Witch is dead
2011 May 2 by les-admin
Osama bin Laden is dead. However, despite some comments on certain media outlets, this does not end terrorism. In fact, if anything, we need to be more alert and aware than ever before. While bin Laden was the clear leader of al Qaeda, terrorism is not a new threat, and Islamic Jihad is a movement that will not stop because of a fallen leader.
Being a veteran of sorts of the drug wars of the late 80s and early 90s, I remember when Pablo Escobar was killed. While Escobar was a kingpin in drug trafficking, and his death was a victory for the good guys, others would take over his supply lines, routes and customers. Drug operations run like terrorist cells, characterized by small operations, consisting of individuals who operate largely independently. They come together, do an operation and then vanish. You can kill a cartel leader, but the trafficking goes on. Others will take their place, some more effective, some less. But it will go on.
What should we expect at this point? First, it would not surprise me to see some low level attacks, lone gunman type situations of followers of bin Laden who are now either leaderless, or let their emotions get the best of them and head to the streets with a gun or bomb. Second, there are plenty of other leaders within al Qaeda out there – particularly in the Yemen area. With bin Laden’s operations severely limited due to the entire world hunting for him, other cells of al Qaeda have ramped up their operations.
Also, remember that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of both the first bombing of the World Trade Center, and Operation Bojinka, a multi-level plot that included blowing up 12 U.S. airliners over the Pacific using liquid-based explosives, and the arrest of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Yousef’s uncle and the mastermind of 9/11, did not stop the al Qaeda engine. This is a 100 years war (probably longer) and the killing of bin Laden, while a necessary response, and a victory on our side, the threat is not going to go away. If anything, the threat will increase as some al Qaeda personnel will “go to ground” (lay low) and may start working more intelligently on either multiple small scale or large-scale attacks.
But for tonight, it’s okay to celebrate. This is a victory. I believe that to a certain extent tonight, maybe some of the victims of 9/11 have been vindicated.
Assault at Denver International Airport
2011 April 15 by les-admin
I used to work as the assistant security director at Denver International Airport. When I saw the story about the recent sexual assault that took place int the terminal building it reminded me, as it should remind every aviation security practitioner and passenger and employee, that aviation security is not just about preventing terrorism, it’s also about preventing common crimes such as assault, drug smuggling, theft and human trafficking.
Large airports are small cities with daily transient populations of 40,000 to 50,000 or more, and employee populations of ten to twenty thousand and up. With that many people, you’re going to have a few that are less then honest.
While theft is the most common airport crime, and assaults are admittedly the least, the question remains, what should or can be done to prevent it? It certainly is a heinous crime. In the case in Denver, airline employees saw what was happening, intervened and summoned both security and police assistance. Word is coming out now that the assault may have been caught on CCTV, however, CCTV is not always an effective method of catching someone in the act of committing a crime, unless someone is watching every camera.
The problem with CCTV is that it’s great at evidence after-the-fact, and has some benefit as a deterrence if the bad guy knows he’s on candid camera, but it’s not very good at catching the act while it’s happening. The problem is, with thousands of cameras at the airport, there are only a few actual monitors and even fewer people watching them. Also, it’s impractical to sit and stare at a monitor all day as humans make terrible system monitors – just ask the FAA guys dozing off in the towers.
Will more CCTV cameras deter this type of crime? The additional question is, will more CCTV monitors provide a better cost/benefit to the airport based on the frequency of the occurrence of this type of crime and, are there more effective methods of preventing, deterring and responding to assaults in the airport. In other words, are there better places to spend money and resources to prevent assaults than buying more cameras?
The chances that an individual monitoring a series of cameras is going to catch a bad guy in the act, considering this type of assault is incredibly rare, is incredibly small.
Many of DIA’s badge holding personnel, whether they work for the airport, the airline, or wherever, if they hold an Airport ID Badge, they’ve been provided with both training in identifying suspicious activities and training in how to notify the airport police in case of an emergency. From early reports, it sounds like some employees may have ignored the woman’s initial cries for help, and it wasn’t until two Frontier Airline ramp workers observed the scene from outside and ran to help, that the assault was stopped and reported. If that’s the case, the individuals who ignored the woman’s pleas, need to be re-trained. And the Frontier employees need a free trip to Disney World for stepping up.
Even though community policing is the strategy for good airport policing, crime still does occur at airports and it’s not always employee theft from baggage and cargo (the most common crimes), nor is it always drug smuggling. Human trafficking, sexual assaults and simple assault, also takes place at U.S. airports – the former more often than many would like to admit.
Perhaps a few more cameras couldn’t hurt – but maybe airports should take a lesson from school security experts and install panic alarms, or train airport and airline workers that in an emergency, if they cannot get to a phone, to activate one of the thousands of door alarms throughout the airport, which will usually get a security or police response rather quickly.
It’s time to issue a BOLO (be on the lookout) to airport police, security guards and operations personnel, and all airport / airline employees for real crime taking place, not just terrorism.
TSA is under fire for advanced screening of a 6-year-old, and they should be
2011 April 14 by les-admin

